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DILLON’S RULE:   
A CHECK ON SHERIFFS’ AUTHORITY  
TO ENTER 287(g) AGREEMENTS 
GREGORY TAYLOR* 
Authority to enforce federal immigration policy in the United States is a power 
traditionally left exclusively to federal government agents.  However, § 287(g) of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act provides a legal framework for state and local law 
enforcement to carry out federal immigration policy by entering a written agreement 
with the federal government.  These partnerships, widely known as “287(g) agreements,” 
are currently in place in seventy-eight jurisdictions nationwide, of which seventy-one are 
between a local sheriff’s office and the Department of Homeland Security.   
This Comment argues that Dillon’s Rule, a doctrine which limits the authority of 
cities, towns, and other localities to act unilaterally without authorization from the 
state legislature, creates a barrier to the enforcement of the 287(g) agreements 
currently in place between sheriffs’ offices and the federal government.  Specifically, 
Dillon’s Rule precludes sheriffs from entering 287(g) agreements without authorization 
from the state legislature, rendering these agreements invalid in most cases.  Accordingly, 
when an individual is detained or otherwise deprived of liberty or due process under an 
invalid 287(g) agreement, constitutional protections should apply. 
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INTRODUCTION 
When the Founding Fathers designed our government, it is unlikely 
they could have anticipated the strain today’s immigration enforcement 
puts on our federalist system.  The intersection between law enforcement 
and the justice sector across state and federal levels involves many 
different individuals and entities in immigration enforcement, creating 
tension and confusion when it comes to the delegation of authority and 
separation of powers.  This tension can be illustrated by an issue that 
courts have yet to consider:  the extent of a sheriff’s authority to 
unilaterally enter into a 287(g) agreement with the U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) in 
states where Dillon’s Rule1 applies and sheriffs are not authorized by state 
law to enter into agreements with the federal government. 
287(g) agreements are contractual partnerships between ICE and state-
level law enforcement.  These agreements derive from § 287(g) of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA),2 which grants the U.S. Attorney 
General authority to delegate federal immigration enforcement power to 
local law enforcement agencies (LEAs) through the execution of a written 
memorandum of agreement (MOA).3  The collaboration necessary for 
the successful implementation of a 287(g) agreement epitomizes the legal 
complexity that can arise from intergovernmental cooperation in 
immigration enforcement, and Dillon’s Rule adds to this already complex 
topic by limiting local law enforcement authority in some jurisdictions. 
                                               
 1. See infra Section II.C. 
 2. Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. 
§§ 1101–1537 (2012)).  This Comment will refer to the statutory provision enabling 
these agreements as “§ 287(g),” and will refer to the agreements themselves as “287(g) 
agreements” or “287(g) MOAs.” 
 3. See 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (codifying § 287(g) of the INA).  For more detail on 
§ 287(g) and § 287(g) MOAs, see infra Section II.B.1. 
1056 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68:1053 
 
This Comment argues that, in most cases, sheriffs are precluded 
from entering into 287(g) agreements in states where Dillon’s Rule 
applies.  Furthermore, the limitation that Dillon’s Rule creates in this 
context invalidates existing 287(g) agreements signed unilaterally by 
sheriffs, and constitutional protections should apply where individuals 
are detained under these invalid MOAs. Part I provides general 
background on U.S. immigration in the context of § 287(g), a brief 
history of the development of Dillon’s Rule, and sets the foundation 
for an analysis of sheriffs’ authority to enter 287(g) agreements.4  Part 
II explains how 287(g) agreements function in practice and discusses 
how Dillon’s Rule can be applied.  Part II also addresses pertinent 
ancillary issues, such as common responsibilities of sheriffs and contract 
law issues that impact the enforceability of a 287(g) agreement.5  Part III 
then applies Dillon’s Rule to a sheriff’s authority to enter a 287(g) 
agreement, taking into consideration counterarguments and peripheral 
issues that could affect a Dillon analysis in this context.6 
I.   BACKGROUND 
A.    U.S. Immigration in the Context of § 287(g) 
George Washington once wrote in a private letter that “[he] had 
always hoped, that this land might become a safe and agreeable asylum 
to the virtuous and persecuted part of mankind, to whatever nation they 
might belong.”7  Despite the first President’s aspirations for the country, 
immigration has proven to be a historically contentious topic in the 
United States, which is amplified when the immigration rate rises.8  The 
1990s, for example, saw a particularly acute spike in immigration rates,9 
                                               
 4. See infra Part I. 
 5. See infra Part II. 
 6. See infra Part III. 
 7. Letter from George Washington to Francis Adrian Van der Kemp, 28 May 
1788, FOUNDERS ONLINE, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/04-
06-02-0266 (last visited Feb. 5, 2019). 
 8. See Becky Little, The Birth of ‘Illegal’ Immigration, HISTORY.COM (Sep. 7, 2017), 
https://www.history.com/news/the-birth-of-illegal-immigration (noting the anti-
immigrant rhetoric of the mid-19th century and describing immigration waves from 
countries such as Ireland, China, Italy, and Mexico). 
 9. See Jeffrey S. Passel & Roberto Suro, Rise, Peak and Decline:  Trends in U.S. 
Immigration 1992–2004, PEW RES. CTR.:  PEW HISPANIC CTR. (2005), http://www.pewr 
esearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/5/reports/53.pdf (providing statistical trends 
in immigration to the United States). 
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compelling Congress to amend § 287 of the INA in an attempt to 
strengthen immigration enforcement by expanding ICE’s powers.10 
Among other things, the 1996 expansion of § 287 allows ICE to 
collaborate with state-level LEAs to enforce federal immigration policy.  
In relevant part, § 287(g)(1) provides that 
the Attorney General may enter into a written agreement with a 
State, or any political subdivision of a State . . . to perform a function 
of an immigration officer . . . [and] may carry out such function at 
the expense of the State or political subdivision and to the extent 
consistent with State and local law.11 
Despite this expansion of § 287, immigration rates continued to rise 
at a record-setting pace into the 2000s, hitting unprecedented highs in 
2014.12  To accommodate this immigration influx, the U.S. immigration 
system has evolved to include an array of enforcement mechanisms 
                                               
 10. See Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 133, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-563 (codified at 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1357(g) (2012)) (adding subsection (g) to § 287 of the INA).  For the sake of 
simplicity, this Comment will use “§ 287” when referencing the text of this statute. 
 11. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g).  Section 287(g) includes ten subsections.  Subsection 2, for 
example, requires participating local law enforcement officers to comply with federal 
law.  See § 1357(g)(2).  Subsection 3 places participating local law enforcement officers 
under the U.S. Attorney General’s supervision.  See § 1357(g)(3).  Subsection 5 
stipulates that the specific powers of “each officer or employee of a state or political 
subdivision who is authorized to perform a function . . . ,” under § 287(g) must be laid 
out in a written MOA.  § 1357(g)(5).  Subsection 9 clarifies that local entities cannot 
be required to enter a 287(g) agreement.  See § 1357(g)(9).  Finally, subsection 10 
acknowledges that a written agreement is not required for local law enforcement to 
communicate or cooperate with federal immigration authorities.  See § 1357(g)(10). 
 12. See, e.g., Steven A. Camarota, A Record-Setting Decade of Immigration:  2000–2010, 
CTR. IMMIGR. STUD. (Oct. 5, 2011), https://cis.org/Report/RecordSetting-Decade-
Immigration-20002010 (summarizing data from the Census Bureau showing that 
almost 14 million immigrants entered the U.S. between 2000 and 2010); MARC R. 
ROSENBLUM, UNACCOMPANIED CHILD MIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES THE TENSION 
BETWEEN PROTECTION AND PREVENTION 1–2 (2015), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/ 
sites/default/files/publications/TCM-Protection-UAC.pdf (describing the surge of 
Central American women and children entering the United States in 2014).  The 
sudden spike in 2014 is widely attributed to instability in Guatemala, Honduras, and 
El Salvador, known collectively as the “northern triangle.”  See Steven A. Camarota, New 
Data:  Immigration Surged in 2014 and 2015, CTR. IMMIGR. STUD. (Jun. 1, 2016), 
https://cis.org/Report/New-Data-Immigration-Surged-2014-and-2015 (noting a 39 
percent increase in immigration rates between 2014 and 2015 from the previous two 
years, primarily from Central Americans).  Rampant violence and poverty in those 
countries, coupled with the desire to reunite with family members, spurred the 
immigration increase of recent years, and these root causes continue to motivate Central 
Americans to risk the journey to the United States.  ROSENBLUM, supra note 12, at 10–15. 
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policing the border.13  For example, recent years have seen the 
proliferation of intergovernmental service agreements, which are 
similar to 287(g) agreements except that they allow ICE to pay directly 
for the cost of detaining undocumented immigrants in local facilities.14  
Local and state governments have also taken action on their own to fill 
the vacuum where Congress has failed to pass effective immigration 
enforcement policy, creating yet another layer of legal and political 
complications for immigrants and legal practitioners to consider.15 
It is against this backdrop that § 287(g) becomes relevant to the 
immigration debate today.  In 2002, Florida became the first state to 
enter a 287(g) agreement, largely motivated by lingering security 
concerns stemming from the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.16  
Following Florida’s example, 287(g) agreements quickly became a 
widespread mechanism for federal immigration enforcement, peaking in 
use during the mid-2000s and tapering off in popularity as President 
Obama ended his second term.17  By 2016, the number of 287(g) 
agreements nationwide had been reduced from seventy in 2010 to just 
                                               
 13. See ROSENBLUM, supra note 12, at 6–11 (outlining the immigration enforcement 
process from intake to removal for undocumented migrants arriving in the U.S.).  See generally 
U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION, 2012–2016 BORDER PATROL STRATEGIC PLAN (2014), 
https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/bp_strategic_plan.pdf (describing the 
goals, objections, strategies, programs, and initiatives the Border Patrol has developed and 
adopted to protect the border). 
 14. See Rachel Frazin, ICE Lets Sheriffs Arrest Immigrants, then Pays to Keep them Locked 
up, DAILY BEAST (Sep. 6, 2018, 4:54 AM), https://www.thedailybeast.com/ice-lets-sheriffs-
arrest-immigrants-then-pays-to-keep-them-locked-up (describing an intergovernmental 
service agreement between ICE and the Tulsa, Oklahoma, sheriff’s department). 
 15. See generally Kristina M. Campbell, Imagining a More Humane Immigration Policy in 
the Age of Obama:  The Use of Plenary Power to Halt the State Balkanization of Immigration 
Regulation, 29 ST. LOUIS. U. PUB. L. REV. 415, 417–34 (2010) (examining a series of state 
and local laws attempting to regulate undocumented immigrants, ranging from housing 
and employment regulations to full out bans prohibiting undocumented immigrants 
from living or working in certain cities).  The extent of state authority to enforce 
immigration policy at the local level is not an entirely settled question, other than to say 
that state law cannot conflict with federal immigration policy.  Id. at 434; see also infra 
Sections II.F, III.F (providing a discussion of preemption in the context of § 287(g)). 
 16. Carrie L. Arnold, Note, Racial Profiling in Immigration Enforcement:  State and 
Local Agreements to Enforce Federal Immigration Law, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 113, 124–25 (2007). 
 17. Kanyakrit Vongkiatkajorn, How the Trump Administration Is Using Local Cops to Widen 
Its Immigration Dragnet, MOTHER JONES (Dec. 4, 2017, 6:00 AM), https://www.motherjones.co 
m/politics/2017/12/how-the-trump-administration-is-using-local-cops-to-widen-its-immigrat 
ion-dragnet (outlining statistical trends associated with the 287(g) program between 2006 
and 2016 such as number of arrests and allocation of funding). 
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thirty-two.18  However, the transition to the Trump administration has 
seen a resurgence of the 287(g) program, and 287(g) agreements are now 
in effect with seventy-eight law enforcement entities across twenty states.19 
Reactions to § 287(g) have been mixed, and courts have recently 
had to consider a range of cases related to the 287(g) program.20  The 
law has drawn criticism from immigration rights advocates,21 while at 
the same time it has been lauded by those in favor of strict immigration 
enforcement.22  The controversy surrounding the statute and the 
                                               
 18. Id. 
 19. See Delegation of Immigration Authority Section 287(g) Immigration and Nationality Act, 
U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, https://www.ice.gov/287g (last updated Aug. 10, 
2018) [hereinafter ICE Section 287(g)] (providing a list of all 287(g) agreements 
nationwide); Mica Rosenberg & Reade Levinson, Police in Trump-Supporting Towns Aid 
Immigration Officials in Crackdown, REUTERS (Nov. 27, 2017, 6:16 AM), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-trump-effect-immigration-police/police-in-trum p-
supporting-towns-aid-immigration-officials-in-crackdown-idUSKBN1DR169 (describing 
how the number of jurisdictions participating in the 287(g) program doubled within the 
first ten months of the Trump Administration); see also Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior 
of the United States, Exec. Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,799 (Jan. 25, 2017) (instructing 
the Secretary of Homeland Security to “immediately take appropriate action to engage with 
Governors of the States, as well as local officials,” to enter into 287(g) agreements). 
 20. See infra Section II.B.2 (discussing several cases considering the extent of state-
level law enforcement authority to carry out federal immigration policy, including 
Santos v. Frederick Cty Bd. Of Comm’rs, 725 F.3d 451 (4th Cir. 2013), and Ochoa v. 
Campbell, 266 F. Supp. 3d 1237 (E.D. Wash 2017)). 
 21. See, e.g., Letter to Secretary Napolitano and Director Morton:  End the 287(g) 
Immigration Enforcement Program (Dec. 11, 2012), https://www.aclu.org/other/ 
letter-secretary-napolitano-and-director-morton-end-287g-immigration-enforcement-
program (signed by 162 non-governmental organizations opposing the 287(g) 
program).  Section 287(g) has drawn criticism for enabling racial profiling in 
particular, as well as for legalizing arguably unconstitutional policing practices.  See 
Jennifer M. Chacón, A Diversion of Attention?  Immigration Courts and the Adjudication of 
Fourth and Fifth Amendment Rights, 59 DUKE L.J. 1563, 1616–17 (2010); see also Arnold, 
supra note 16, at 139–42 (2007) (concluding that the training provided by ICE for 
LEAs under the 287(g) program does not sufficiently mitigate racial profiling). 
 22. See, e.g., Examining 287(g):  The Role of State and Local Law Enforcement in 
Immigration Law:  Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Homeland Security, 111th Cong. 5–6 
(2009) (statement of Rep. Smith) (“Those who are serious about public safety should 
not only support the [287(g)] program, but also call for its expansion.”); U.S. Sen. Jeff 
Sessions & Cynthia Hayden, The Growing Role for State & Local Law Enforcement in the 
Realm of Immigration Law, 16 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 323, 346 (2005) (illustrating then 
Senator Sessions’s support for the 287(g) program); see also Emily Wood, Sheriff Jones:  
‘If You Commit Crime . . . You Should be Deported,’ WLWT5 NEWS (Feb. 7, 2017, 11:38 PM), 
http://www.wlwt.com/article/sheriff-jones-if-you-commit-crimeyou-should-be-deport 
ed/8690722 (providing the perspective of a local sheriff supporting the 287(g) 
program for the autonomy it gives localities to enforce laws they feel are important).  
Other provisions of § 287 are also controversial.  For example, § 287(d) has been 
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renewed proliferation of 287(g) agreements calls for greater clarity 
surrounding a grey area in the law:  the extent of local government 
authority to unilaterally participate in the 287(g) program. 
B.    A Brief History of Dillon’s Rule and Home Rule 
Arising during the urban boom of the mid-1800s, Dillon’s Rule is a 
common principle of law that aids courts in determining the extent of 
local government authority.23  Specifically, Dillon’s Rule provides that 
only the state government has the authority to empower local 
government officials, and local governments cannot act outside the 
scope of the authority granted by the state legislature.24 
Dillon’s Rule was first established by the Iowa Supreme Court in 
Clinton v. Cedar Rapids & Missouri River Railroad Co.,25 a decision which 
limited local government authority and addressed systemic problems 
facing the contemporary American municipal system.26  In Clinton, the 
                                               
criticized for enabling the federal government to issue immigration detainers.  
Christopher N. Lasch, Federal Immigration Detainers After Arizona v. United States, 46 LOY. 
L.A. L. REV. 629, 690–94 (2013) (discussing some of the legal obstacles posed by 
§ 287(d)).  Section 287(g)(10) has also generated controversy as a nebulous component 
of the statute arguably allowing local law enforcement to circumvent subsection (1), 
which requires a written MOA.  Compare City of El Cenizo v. Texas, 264 F. Supp. 3d 744, 
771–75 (W.D. Tex. 2017) (rejecting Texas’s argument that § 287(g)(10) provided a way 
for LEAs to routinely enforce immigration law without a written MOA), with City of El 
Cenizo v. Texas, 890 F.3d 164, 177 (5th Cir. 2018) (finding that § 287(g)(10) “expressly 
allows cooperation in immigration enforcement outside” written MOAs). 
 23. See SANDRA M. STEVENSON, ANTIEAU ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW § 21.01 
(Matthew Bender & Co. ed, 2d ed. 2009) (explaining how Dillon’s Rule limits local 
government authority); Diane Lang, Dillon’s Rule . . . and the Birth of Home Rule, N.M. 
MUN. LEAGUE (Dec. 1991), https://nmml.org/wp-content/uploads/dillon.pdf 
(summarizing the historical circumstances that preceded Dillion’s Rule). 
 24. STEVENSON, supra note 23, § 21.01. 
 25. 24 Iowa 455 (1868). 
 26. See A.E.S., Note, Dillon’s Rule:  The Case for Reform, 68 VA. L. REV. 693, 694 (1982) 
(according to Justice Dillon, the authority vested in local government “ought to be 
more carefully defined and limited, and should embrace such objects only as are 
necessary for the health, welfare, safety, and convenience of the inhabitants” (quoting 
J. DILLON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 237 (5th ed. 
1911))).  By the 1800s, widespread corruption had taken over much of the American 
municipal system, and American cities had become a “conspicuous failure of the 
United States.”  Jon D. Russell & Aaron Bostrom, Federalism, Dillon Rule and Home Rule 
4 (2016), https://www.alec.org/app/uploads/2016/01/2016-ACCE-White-Paper-
Dillon-House-Rule-Final.pdf (quoting a British Lord’s critique of the American 
municipal system).  Justice Dillon himself was a known critic of the American 
municipal system, with one commentator noting that Justice Dillon embodied a 
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Iowa Supreme Court ruled that the power of local government is 
derived entirely from the state legislature.27  Writing for the majority, 
Justice Dillon explained his rationale for what has become known as 
Dillon’s Rule:  “Municipal corporations owe their origin to, and derive 
their powers and rights wholly from, the legislature.  It breathes into 
them the breath of life, without which they cannot exist.”28 
Since Clinton, Dillon’s Rule has been approved by the United States 
Supreme Court in multiple decisions.  In Merrill v. Town of Monticello,29 
for example, the Court held that an Indiana town was precluded from 
issuing bonds for sale in the open market because the town did not 
have express or implied authorization from the state legislature to sell 
bonds.30  About fifteen years later, the Court further reinforced 
Dillon’s Rule in Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh,31 where Justice Moody stated 
the Court’s position emphatically:  “Municipal corporations are . . . 
created as convenient agencies for exercising such of the 
governmental powers of the state as may be intrusted [sic] to them . . . .  
[T]he state is supreme, and its legislative body . . . may do as it will.”32  
Since these seminal cases, Dillon’s Rule has become established 
jurisprudence throughout the country, and the doctrine is recognized 
by a majority of the states.33  
                                               
common view of local government during the 19th century through his skepticism of 
the ability of localities to effectively govern themselves.  Id. 
 27. Id. at 475. 
 28. Id.  A municipal corporation is a “city, town, or other local political entity 
formed by charter from the state and having the autonomous authority to administer 
the state’s local affair . . . [a]lso termed municipality.”  Municipal Corporation, BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 29. 138 U.S. 673 (1891). 
 30. Id. at 686–88, 691–93.  The Court in Town of Monticello even went as far as to 
quote directly from Justice Dillon’s treatise on municipal corporations, explicitly 
ingraining Dillon’s Rule in Supreme Court precedent.  See id. at 681. 
 31. 207 U.S. 161 (1907). 
 32. Id. at 178–79. 
 33. See Russell & Bostrom, supra note 26, at 8 (stating that “[t]hirty-one states apply 
the Dillon Rule or a combination of Dillon’s Rule and Home Rule to local jurisdictions”).  
Dillon’s Rule has been invoked in recent years in the context of issues creating tension 
between local and state government such as the removal of confederate monuments, 
fracking, and marijuana regulation.  See April McCullum, Vermont Towns Have Limited 
Options to Regulate Marijuana, for Now, BURLINGTON FREE PRESS (Jul. 11, 2018, 8:06 AM), 
https://www.burlingtonfreepress.com/story/news/politics/government/2018/07/11/
vermont-marijuana-towns-and-cities-have-limited-options/761412002 (stating that 
“Vermont towns have no authority [to regulate marijuana] that is not explicitly granted 
by the Legislature”); Daniel C. Vock, The End of Local Laws?  War on Cities Intensifies in 
Texas, GOVERNING (Apr. 5, 2017), http://www.governing.com/topics/politics/gov-
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Dillon’s Rule was not without its opponents in the U.S. legal context 
when it was first created, and there are commentators who still criticize 
the doctrine today.34  Shortly after the establishment of Dillon’s Rule, 
certain states adopted what became known as “Home Rule” to counter 
the limitation of Dillon’s Rule.35  Unlike Dillon’s Rule, Home Rule 
explicitly confers authority from the state legislature to local 
governments to determine and enforce their own powers without 
interference from the state government.36  The first Home Rule law, 
set forth by Missouri as an amendment to the state constitution in 1875, 
provided that any Missouri city exceeding 100,000 in population could 
“frame a charter for its own government, consistent with and subject 
to the Constitution and the laws of the State.”37  The United States 
Supreme Court affirmed the legitimacy of Home Rule in City of St. Louis 
v. Western Union Telephone Co.,38 interpreting the original Home Rule law 
to allow the city of St. Louis authority to regulate its own streets.39  In 
denying a subsequent petition for rehearing, the Court explained that 
the city derived its power from its charter pursuant to the Missouri 1875 
                                               
texas-abbott-preemption.html (describing a proposal by Texas Governor Greg Abbott to 
strip 352 Home Rule cities in Texas of their ability to enact regulations that do not 
conflict with state law and treat them as general-rule cities, permitting local regulations 
in areas specifically permitted by the state); Rich Schragger, Is Charlottesville’s Robert E. Lee 
Statue Illegal?, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH (Aug. 30, 2017), https://www.richmond.c 
om/opinion/their-opinion/guest-columnists/rich-schragger-column-is-charlottesville-s-
robert-e-lee-statue/article_888d6495-6176-5cea-9278-71018d2 93f2a.html (reporting on 
the authority of Charlottesville to remove a statue of confederate general, Robert E. Lee, 
under Virginia law, which still adheres to the Dillon’s Rule). 
 34. A.E.S, supra note 26, at 702 (arguing that Dillon’s Rule, in its current form, 
“fails to bring local government under state control, but succeeds in hampering its 
effective administration”); Peter F. Nascenzi, Note, FTC v. Phoebe Putney and 
Municipalities as Nongovernments, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 363, 383–84 (2016). 
 35. See David J. Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2255, 2294 (2003) 
(“[T]he home rule movement overcame the shackles that Dillon’s Rule placed on local 
government initiative.”). 
 36. STEVENSON, supra note 23, § 21.01.  In the late nineteenth century, the early Home 
Rule supporters coined the term “home rule” to convey a sentiment of local autonomy.  See 
Barron, supra note 35, at 2279–80.  Compared to the critics of the American municipal 
system who supported the creation of Dillon’s Rule, the early Home Rule proponents 
believed in the independence of strong local government.  See id. at 2292–94. 
 37. MO. CONST. art. IX, § 16 (1875); see also Russell & Bostrom, supra note 26, at 6 
(noting that most states apply Home Rule only to certain municipalities, often based 
on population size).  In the Home Rule context, a charter is a document formalizing 
the establishment of a local political body and defining the way a locality will govern 
itself.  Charter, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 38. 148 U.S. 92 (1983). 
 39. Id. at 103–04. 
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Home Rule law.40  By enabling certain localities to craft a charter 
defining the scope of their own authority,41 the original Home Rule 
statute strengthened the autonomy of city governments in Missouri, 
setting an example for other states to follow.42 
Whereas Dillon’s Rule limits local government authority by 
reinforcing state legislatures’ oversight, Home Rule empowers 
localities to exercise their independence by determining their own 
laws.43  In her treatise on local government law, professor Sandra M. 
Stevenson provides a helpful illustration of the contrast between 
Dillon’s Rule and Home Rule as existing along a spectrum.44  At one 
end of the spectrum, local governments have limited autonomy and 
are prohibited from taking action without “express[] and 
unambiguous[]” authorization from the state legislature or 
constitution.45  At the other end of the spectrum, local governments 
have substantial autonomy with full authority to take any action the 
state legislature would otherwise be able to do “that has not been 
explicitly forbidden by state law.”46  This balance between Dillon’s Rule 
and Home Rule creates a natural tension between state and local 
governments inherent to our system of federalism, and when the 
doctrines conflict, each state has its own method of determining which 
rule governs.47  However, the United States is generally considered to 
lean towards the limited autonomy end of the spectrum because of the 
limiting force that Dillon’s Rule provides.48 
                                               
 40. See City of St. Louis v. Western Union Tel. Co., 149 U.S. 465, 467–68 (1893) (“As the 
legislative power of a state is vested in the legislature, generally that body has the supreme 
control, and it delegates to municipal corporations such measure thereof as it deems best.”). 
 41. A charter is not the only method states use to implement Home Rule.  For more on 
charters, see infra Section II.D.3.  Some states have Home Rule constructions allowing 
localities to simply make their own laws without requiring the adoption of a charter.  Id. 
 42. See infra Section II.D (discussing Home Rule constructions in a range of states). 
 43. See Barron, supra note 35, at 2259–61 (discussing how Home Rule allows local 
government with greater independence). 
 44. STEVENSON, supra note 23, § 21.01. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. For a discussion of how Dillon’s Rule and Home Rule conflict in the context 
of § 287(g), see infra Sections III.B, III.C. 
 48. STEVENSON, supra note 23, § 21.01. 
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II.   SECTION 287(g), DILLON’S RULE, AND  
COMMON DUTIES OF THE SHERIFF 
A.    Contract Law and 287(g) Agreements 
A 287(g) MOA is a type of contract, and thus governed by contract 
law principles.  In fact, the Supreme Court has applied contract law 
principles to MOAs dating as far back as 1809.  In Violett v. Patton,49 the 
Court considered whether the contemporary Virginia statute of frauds 
applied to the endorsement of a promissory note, holding that the 
“memorandum of agreement” was not in writing, and the statute of 
frauds thus did not apply.50  Similarly, lower courts have more recently 
applied contract law principles to MOAs.  For example, in APMD 
Holdings, Inc. v. Praesidium Medical Professional Liability Insurance Co.,51 
two parties entered a MOA to combine resources for the creation of a 
joint business venture.52  The MOA included terms defining how the 
parties would collaborate, the distribution of company stock, and the 
governing structure of the corporation the parties sought to create.53  
The Texas Court of Appeals held that the MOA constituted “a binding 
and enforceable contract” because it set forth consideration owed by 
both parties and the terms were clear and definite.54 
1. Agency law 
Agency law dictates that a contract between entities is only valid and 
enforceable when all signatories to the agreement are authorized to 
bind their respective entities in contract.55  In this context, a dispute 
                                               
 49. 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 142 (1809). 
 50. Id. at 149–51, 154. 
 51. 555 S.W.3d 697 (Tex. App. 2018). 
 52. Id. at 701–02. 
 53. Id. at 702–03, 708–09. 
 54. Id. at 711.  The holding in Praesidium Medical is consistent with other court 
decisions insofar as it applies contract law to MOAs.  See, e.g., Kim v. Baik, No. 2014-
SCC-0014-CIV, 2016 WL 3034068, at *5 (N. Mar. I. May 27, 2016) (determining a MOA 
to be a “final written contract” constituting a binding lease for property); Strategic 
Staff Mgmt., Inc. v. Roseland, 619 N.W.2d 230, 234 (Neb. 2000) (finding a MOA to 
settle a case “subject to the general principles of contract law” (citing Woodmen of the 
World Life Ins. Soc’y v. Kight, 522 N.W.2d 155 (Neb. 1994)); Canal Ins. Co. v. Liberty 
Mut. Ins., 395 F. Supp. 962, 974 (N.D. Ga. 1975) (concluding that a MOA constituted 
a binding service contract between two parties). 
 55. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY, § 1.01 (AM. L. INST. 2006) (defining “agency” as 
the “fiduciary relationship that arises when one person (a ‘principal’) manifests assent to 
another person (an ‘agent’) that the agent shall act on the principal’s behalf and subject to 
the principal’s control, and the agent manifests assent or otherwise consents so to act”). 
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can occur, for example, when an employee signs a contract with a third 
party on behalf of his employer without the employer granting 
authority to the employee to enter binding contracts.56 
The Third Restatement of Agency recognizes two primary types of 
authority:  “actual authority” and “apparent authority.”57  Actual 
authority is created when the principal—a person or entity entering a 
contract—overtly manifests to the agent an intention for the agent to 
have the authority to act on the principal’s behalf.58  To determine the 
extent of an agent’s authority, courts examine whether the principal 
has made explicit or implicit manifestations towards the agent that 
cause the agent to reasonably believe that he has authority to act on 
behalf of the principal.59  In contrast, apparent authority is created 
when the principal overtly manifests to a third party that the agent is 
acting on the principal’s behalf.60  For an agent to have apparent 
authority, the principal must make direct or indirect manifestations 
towards a third party, causing the third party to actually and reasonably 
believe that the agent has authority to bind the principal.61 
2. Agency law applied to government entities 
Agency law is applicable to government entities, as it is to private 
corporations.62  In Federal Crop Insurance Corp. v. Merrill,63 the Supreme 
Court explained that express authorization is required from Congress 
for a government agent to bind the government in contract, regardless 
of whether the agent has actual knowledge of the extent of his 
                                               
 56. See Alan I. Saltman, The Government’s Liability for Actions of its Agents that are Not 
Specifically Authorized:  The Continuing Influence of Merrill and Richmond, 32 PUB. CONT. L.J. 
775, 778 (2003) (noting that contractual conflicts arise when an unauthorized agent enters 
a contract on behalf of its principal); Yedia Z. Stern, Corporate Liability for Unauthorized 
Contracts—Unification of the Rules of Corporate Representation, 9 U. PENN. J. INT’L BUS. L. 649, 
650 (1987) (acknowledging that when the representative of an organization exceeds his 
authority in entering a contract, an “unauthorized contract . . . results”). 
 57. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §§ 2.01, 2.03. 
 58. §§ 2.01–2.02. 
 59. See Kirkpatrick v. Boston Mut. Life Ins. Co., 473 N.E.2d 173, 176–77 (Mass. 
1985); A. Gay Jenson Farms Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 309 N.W. 2d 285 (Minn. 1981); see also 
Chad P. Wade, Note, The Double Doctrine Agent:  Streamlining the Restatement (Third) of 
Agency by Eliminating the Apparent Agency Doctrine, 42 VAL. U. L. REV. 341, 352–55 (2007) 
(reviewing actual authority as laid out by the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY). 
 60. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.03. 
 61. See Wade, supra note 59, at 355–58. 
 62. See Saltman, supra note 56, at 776–77 (highlighting that agency theory applies 
to government agencies). 
 63. 332 U.S. 380 (1947). 
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authority.64  In Merrill, Idaho farmers purchased insurance from an 
agent of a federally-owned insurance corporation who sold the 
insurance even though a federal regulation precluded the farmers 
from being able to collect insurance when their crops were destroyed.65  
The Court decided that the farmers could not collect insurance 
payments, holding that the agent did not have authority to bind the 
federal government in contract regardless of the agent’s lack of actual 
knowledge of the existence of the conflicting regulation.66   
Later, in Office of Personnel Management v. Richmond,67 the Court 
reaffirmed its position that government employees cannot bind the 
federal government where they are not authorized to do so.68  The 
Richmond Court held that a government employee’s mistake in 
providing information regarding a disability benefits application did 
not bind the government to cover the cost of the plaintiff’s relief 
because federal statute precluded the specific type of benefit the 
plaintiff was initially seeking.69  Thus, “the Government could not be 
bound by the mistaken representations of an agent unless it were clear 
that the representations were within the scope of the agent’s 
authority.”70  Cases like Merrill and Richmond are consistent in defining 
the agency of a government representative even more narrowly than 
in cases of private corporations.71 
B.    Section 287(g) in Practice 
As explained in Part I, 287(g) agreements endow LEAs with the 
authority to carry out certain functions of federal immigration 
enforcement.  Over the years, ICE has used two different types of 
287(g) MOAs:  the “Task Force Officer Model” and the “Detention 
                                               
 64. Id. at 384.   
 65. Id. at 381–82. 
 66. Id. at 384–86.  
 67. 496 U.S. 414 (1990). 
 68. See id. at 419–20. 
 69. See id. at 416–20, 431–32. 
 70. Id. at 419–20 (citing Lee v. Munroe & Thornton, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 366 (1813)). 
 71. See Saltman, supra note 56, at 783–85 (addressing agency theory in the context 
of government contracts); see also Jeffrey F. Ghent, Annotation, Doctrine of Apparent 
Authority as Applied to Agent of Municipality, 77 A.L.R.3d 925 § 3 (1977) (noting the 
confusion and lack of consistency among courts in construing the agency of 
government representatives). 
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Model.”72  However, the Detention Model, which provides local law 
enforcement with the ability to administer detention facilities for the 
purpose of immigration enforcement,73 is the only model currently in 
use.74  Like any contract, 287(g) agreements govern the cooperation 
between the federal government and participating LEA, and courts 
have interpreted § 287(g) as requiring the execution of a 287(g) 
agreement for state or local officials to carry out immigration policy in 
most circumstances where the issue has come up.75 
1. A standard 287(g) agreement 
MOAs under § 287(g) set forth the terms and conditions governing the 
collaboration between ICE and the state-level LEA entering a 287(g) 
agreement.76  LEAs typically agree to nominate qualified law enforcement 
officials to participate in a training program, compensate the officials 
while they are trained, and provide local facilities to detain suspected 
undocumented immigrants.77  In exchange for participation in the 
287(g) program, ICE agrees to provide technical training to qualified 
participants, reimburse costs associated with the implementation of the 
MOA (such as transportation of inmates), and delegate authority to 
enforce federal immigration policy.78 
2. Local law enforcement authority under § 287(g) 
A 287(g) MOA is typically required for state-level law enforcement to 
arrest or detain individuals under federal immigration law in the 
                                               
 72. Nicholas D. Michaud, Comment, From 287(g) to SB 1070:  The Decline of the 
Federal Immigration Partnership and the Rise of State-Level Immigration Enforcement, 52 ARIZ. 
L. REV. 1083, 1093 (2010).  
 73. Id.  As compared to the Detention Model, the Task Force Officer Model equips 
local law enforcement to investigate suspected undocumented immigrants.  Id.  
 74.  See 287(g) RESULTS AND PARTICIPATING ENTITIES, https://www.ice.gov/287g 
(last visited Feb. 5, 2019) (outlining all of the 287(g) MOAs currently in place 
nationwide).  The Task Force model has faced substantial criticism from immigrants’ 
rights groups because it arguably serves as a license for racial profiling.  Campbell, 
supra note 15, at 437–43 (2010). 
 75. See, e.g., Santos v. Frederick Cty. Bd. Of Comm’rs, 725 F.3d 451 (4th Cir. 2013); 
Ochoa v. Campbell, 266 F. Supp. 3d 127 (E.D. Wash. 2017), vacated as moot, 716 Fed App’x 
741 (9th Cir. 2018) (mem.); Lunn v. Commonwealth, 78 N.E.3d 1143 (Mass. 2017). 
 76. See generally Memorandum of Agreement Template, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS 
ENFORCEMENT, https://www.ice.gov/doclib/detention-reform/pdf/287g_moa.pdf (last 
visited Feb. 5, 2019) (providing a publicly available template for 287(g) agreements). 
 77. See id. at 2–4. 
 78. See id. at 1–4. 
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absence of other authority.  For example, in Ochoa v. Campbell,79 the 
District Court for the Eastern District of Washington determined that 
Fourth Amendment protections apply when local authorities execute 
immigration detainers because state and local law enforcement can only 
enforce federal immigration policy under the auspices of a “formal, 
written [287(g)] agreement[].”80  Similarly, in Santos v. Frederick County 
Board of Commissioners,81 the Fourth Circuit held that local law 
enforcement violated the Fourth Amendment by detaining a Salvadoran 
woman under a civil ICE warrant because there was no 287(g) 
agreement in place.82  The court specified that the officers’ conduct was 
unlawful because they were not authorized by a 287(g) agreement to 
carry out federal immigration policy.83  However, the court left the door 
open to the possibility that “express direction . . . by federal statute or 
federal officials” might, by itself, empower local law officials to enforce 
ICE policy.84  The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts examined 
this same issue in Lunn v. Commonwealth.85  In Lunn, state police, without 
a 287(g) agreement, held a suspect under an immigration detainer in a 
municipal jail at the request of federal immigration officials.86  The 
Massachusetts court held that the plaintiff’s detention was impermissible 
because the state police had no authority to enforce federal immigration 
policy in the absence of a 287(g) agreement.87 
                                               
 79. 266 F. Supp. 3d 1237 (E.D. Wash. 2017), vacated as moot, 716 Fed. App’x 741 
(9th Cir. 2018) (mem.). 
 80. Id. at 1254–55, 1258–59.  In Ochoa, local authorities detained a man on an 
immigration hold without a 287(g) agreement in place and, in doing so, prohibited him 
from posting bail for his release.  Id. at 1242.  Ochoa brought suit against the state 
Department of Corrections, seeking a temporary restraining order to remove the 
immigration hold.  Id.  The District Court granted his requesting, finding that he was likely 
to succeed on the merits of his Fourth Amendment claims.  Id. at 1258–59.  The defendants 
appealed, but the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed the case as moot since ICE took 
Ochoa into custody after he was released from jail.  See Ochoa, 716 Fed. App’x at 742. 
 81. 725 F.3d 451 (4th Cir. 2013). 
 82. Id. at 457–58, 463–65. 
 83. Id. at 463–65. 
 84. Id. at 465.  While a 287(g) agreement is needed for local law enforcement officials 
to detain individuals suspected of violating federal immigration policy, state-level law 
enforcement is not always precluded from cooperating with ICE for immigration 
enforcement.  See United States v. Ovando-Garzo, 752 F.3d 1161, 1164 (8th Cir. 2014) 
(holding that cooperation between a state trooper conducting a traffic stop and Border 
Patrol was appropriate under § 287(g), even in the absence of a 287(g) agreement). 
 85. 78 N.E.3d 1143 (Mass. 2017). 
 86. Id. at 1146. 
 87. See id. at 1160 (ruling that “Massachusetts law provides no authority for 
Massachusetts court officers to arrest and hold an individual solely on the basis of a 
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C.   Dillon’s Rule 
Dillon’s Rule has developed to include three criteria to determine 
the extent of local government authority:  local governments only have 
those powers that are (1) expressly granted by state legislation, 
(2) necessarily implied from those powers expressly granted, or 
(3) essential to the functioning of the local municipal body.88  As of 
2016, Dillon’s Rule was considered good law in at least thirty-one states, 
though courts in different jurisdictions have been known to apply the 
three Dillon factors in varying ways.89  For example, some jurisdictions 
rely heavily on the first factor, while others give weight to all three.90  
Many courts have also interpreted the doctrine to weigh the factors 
more evenly, requiring only one of them to be met for authority to 
extend to local government.91  Ultimately, every jurisdiction has a 
different construction of Dillon’s Rule, meaning that a Dillon analysis 
must be adapted to the case law in each jurisdiction where the doctrine 
applies and cannot be uniformly applied across multiple states.92 
1. Express authority 
The first criterion of Dillon’s Rule examines whether the state 
legislature has expressly granted local government with the authority in 
                                               
Federal civil immigration detainer, beyond the time that the individual would 
otherwise be entitled to be released from State custody”). 
 88. See, e.g., Homebuilders Ass’n of Charlotte, Inc. v. City of Charlotte, 442 S.E.2d 45, 
49 (N.C. 1994) (maintaining that local government has authority “granted in express 
words . . . necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to the powers expressly granted . . . [and 
that which is] essential” (quoting DILLON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL 
CORPORATIONS § 237 (5th ed. 1911))); Bd. of Supervisors v. Countryside Inv. Co., 522 
S.E.2d 610, 612–13 (Va. 1999) (stating that Dillon’s Rule “provides that municipal 
corporations have only those powers that are expressly granted, those necessarily or fairly 
implied from expressly granted powers, and those that are essential and indispensable” 
(quoting City of Chesapeake v. Gardner Enters., 482 S.E.2d 812, 814 (Va. 1997))). 
 89. See Russell & Bostrom, supra note 26, at 8; see also STEVENSON, supra note 23, 
§ 24.01 n.18 (providing examples of cases from a variety of states applying Dillon’s Rule). 
 90. Compare State ex rel. Cole v. Keller, 176 So. 176, 180 (Fla. 1937) (mem.) (noting 
definitively that if “any reasonable doubt” exists as to whether a municipal corporation 
has been granted the express power to exercise authority then it “will be resolved 
against the municipality”) with Town of McIntyre v. Baldwin, 6 S.E.2d 372, 373 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 1939) (examining whether “a grant of power . . . may necessarily be implied” 
from legislative text). 
 91. See STEVENSON, supra note 23, § 24.03 (noting several states that take a liberal 
approach to Dillon’s Rule where the factors are construed in municipalities’ favor). 
 92. See id. (noting various states’ interpretation of Dillon’s Rule). 
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question.93  For example, in Board of Supervisors v. Countryside Investment 
Co.,94 the Supreme Court of Virginia held that the powers of the Augusta 
County Board of Supervisors did not empower it to enact a local 
ordinance because there was not express authority from the state 
legislature for the Board to do so.95  Decisions similar to Countryside 
Investment Co. indicate that an application of the first Dillon factor can, 
by itself, determine the outcome of a case,96 but courts oftentimes 
proceed to consider all three factors as part of their analysis.97 
2. Implied authority 
Courts may also extend the authority of local government to those 
powers necessarily implied from expressly granted powers.98  For 
example, in Perretta v. City of New Britain,99 the Connecticut Supreme 
Court held that the authority of a city’s mayor to fire city employees was 
within the mayor’s powers because such powers could be implied from 
the mayor’s expressly granted authority as the city’s chief executive 
officer.100  The Perretta court reasoned that, as chief executive, the mayor 
                                               
 93. § 21.01. 
 94. 522 S.E.2d 610 (Va. 1999). 
 95. Id. at 613. 
 96. See Bowie Inn, Inc. v. City of Bowie, 335 A.2d 679, 689 (Md. 1975) (holding 
that a city ordinance to regulate garbage was expressly authorized by state statute and 
thus within the powers of the city); Novak v. Town of Poughkeepsie, 311 N.Y.S.2d 393, 
396–97 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1970) (concluding that a city ordinance was invalid because it 
“deviate[d] from the strict letter of the enabling statutes”); Reese v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 676 S.E.2d 481, 491 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009) (superseded by 
statute on other grounds) (determining that a county had authority to sell real 
property because such authority was expressly vested in the county by state statute). 
 97. See Vill. of N. Fargo v. City of Fargo, 192 N.W. 977, 981 (N.D. 1923) (inquiring 
into all three Dillon’s Rule factors in examining whether a municipality had the power 
to annex the territory of another municipality). 
 98. See Girves v. Kenai Peninsula Borough, 536 P.2d 1221, 1224 (Alaska 1975) 
(determining that a borough had authority to build a school access road on private 
property because the power to do so was implied from express authority to manage local 
schools); O’Bryan v. City of Louisville, 382 S.W.2d 386, 388 (Ky. Ct. App. 1964) (holding 
that a statute granting a city authority to establish parks and recreational areas impliedly 
granted authority to establish a zoo); Homebuilders Ass’n of Charlotte, Inc. v. City of 
Charlotte, 442 S.E.2d 45, 49 (N.C. 1994) (“[T]he municipal power to regulate an activity 
implies the power to impose a fee in an amount sufficient to cover the cost of 
regulation.”); Town of Clearfield v. Cushman, 440 N.W.2d 777, 781 (Wis. 1989) (holding 
that a town has the authority to enforce building permits even though such authority is 
not expressly granted by the legislature because such power is necessarily implied). 
 99. 440 A.2d 823 (Conn. 1981). 
 100. Id. at 829–30. 
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is charged with ensuring the city’s fiscal sovereignty, and the ability to 
dismiss personnel is necessarily implied from that responsibility.101  
However, the interpretation of local governments’ implied powers 
under Dillon’s Rule is oftentimes narrowly construed,102 as the North 
Carolina Supreme Court determined in Porsh Builders, Inc. v. City of 
Winston-Salem.103  There, the court held that the authority for a city to 
reject the highest bidder for a government contract was not implied 
from the city’s express power to reject lower bids.104  In its decision, the 
court acknowledged that “statutory delegations of power to 
municipalities should be strictly construed, resolving any ambiguity 
against the [city’s] authority to exercise the power.”105 
3. Essential authority 
The third, and most narrowly applied,106 Dillon factor is that local 
governments can exercise those powers that are “essential”107 to the 
locality, even in the absence of express or implied authority.108  This aspect 
of a Dillon analysis can come into play when localities are forced to react 
to emergencies.  In Willson v. Boise City,109 the Idaho Supreme Court held 
                                               
 101. Id. 
 102. See STEVENSON, supra note 23, § 24.03 (explaining the strict construction of 
implied powers and detailing cases from numerous jurisdictions accordingly). 
 103. 276 S.E.2d 443 (N.C. 1981). 
 104. Id. at 445–46. 
 105. Id. at 445. 
 106. See STEVENSON, supra note 23, § 24.02 (noting that some states do not recognize 
inherent essential local government powers, and that for those states that do, “they are 
admittedly not many in number”). 
 107. Homebuilders Ass’n of Charlotte, Inc. v. City of Charlotte, 442 S.E.2d 45, 49 
(N.C. 1994) (quoting DILLON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 
§ 237 (5th ed. 1911)). 
 108. See City of Bessemer v. Birmingham Elec. Co., 27 So. 2d 565, 573 (Ala. 1945) 
(acknowledging that a municipal corporation’s ability to grant franchises “is one of 
the incidental powers of a municipal corporation”); State ex rel. Radcliff v. City of 
Mobile, 155 So. 872, 874 (Ala. 1934) (providing that local government authority 
includes those powers “which are indispensably necessary to the declared objects and 
germane to the governmental purpose for which such corporations may be 
organized”); Willson v. Boise City, 55 P. 887, 889 (Idaho 1899) (holding that a town 
has the power to divert stream water outside the city to protect its residents’ properties 
because such authority is “necessary”).  Justice Dillon defined the third factor as powers 
“essential to the accomplishment of the declared objects and purposes of the 
corporation,— [sic] not simply convenient, but indispensable.”  Homebuilders Ass’n, 442 
S.E.2d at 49 (quoting DILLON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 
§ 237 (5th ed. 1911)). 
 109. 55 P. 887 (Idaho 1899). 
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that a municipality had the authority to divert stream water by building a 
ditch extending outside the city even in the absence of express authority 
to construct outside the city limits.110  The court determined that the 
authority to divert stream water was “necessary” for the city to protect its 
citizens and thus within the scope of the locality’s powers.111   
The third criterion in a Dillon analysis can also include situations 
where effective municipal administration requires that certain powers 
be conferred to local governments even if the powers are not expressly 
or impliedly authorized by state law.  For example, in State ex rel. Ennis 
v. Superior Court,112 the Supreme Court of Washington held that a 
municipal governing body had authority to remove an employee from 
office despite the fact that the city’s charter did not provide the 
governing body with that power because authority to dismiss the 
employee was necessary for the city’s administration.113 
4. Distinguishing between implied and essential authority 
While the second and third Dillon factors are distinct from each 
other, the concepts of implied authority and essential authority can 
also run together in court decisions.  The difference in the holdings of 
Perretta and Ennis illustrates this ambiguity in the doctrine.  In both 
cases, the courts held that local government had the ability to dismiss 
an employee, and both decisions provide similar rationale for their 
conclusions.114  However, the court in Perretta determined that it was 
the mayor’s implied authority to dismiss a city employee,115 while the 
court in Ennis held the authority was simply necessary, and did not 
comment on the possibility of implied authority.116  This dynamic 
suggests that the distinction between essential and implied authority is 
influenced by the ability for courts to support their conclusions.  
Implied authority can derive from existing policy (i.e., a charter or 
statute) while essential authority is more of a policy position 
unsubstantiated by black letter law. 
                                               
 110. Id. at 889–91. 
 111. Id. at 889. 
 112. 279 P. 601 (Wash. 1929). 
 113. Id. at 606. 
 114. Perretta v. City of New Britain, 440 A.2d 823, 829 (Conn. 1981); Ennis, 279 P. at 606. 
 115. See Perretta, 440 A.2d at 829 (justifying dismissal of employees “for reasons of 
economy” as falling within the city’s express and implied powers). 
 116. Ennis, 279 P. at 606. 
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D.    Home Rule 
Each state where Home Rule applies extends varying breadths of 
authority to local governments, and courts’ interpretation of respective 
state Home Rule constructions has developed accordingly.  However, 
when a local rule or law created under Home Rule is determined to 
conflict with state law, the state law governs. 
1. Imperio Home Rule constructions 
Some Home Rule constructions allow local governments wide 
discretion to determine their own rules and laws without any express 
limitation.  Broad Home Rules of this type are known as “imperio” 
provisions for the colorful language Justice Brewer used in writing 
St. Louis.117  For example, the California state constitution provides that 
“[i]t shall be competent in any city charter to provide that the city 
governed thereunder may make and enforce all ordinances and 
regulations in respect to municipal affairs.”118  Similarly, Wisconsin has 
left its Home Rule language succinctly open-ended, with its state 
constitution allowing for “[c]ities and villages . . . [to] determine their 
local affairs and government.”119 
Localities in states with Home Rule constructions granting broad, 
unlimited power to local government are free to exercise their own 
self-governance without interference from the state legislature unless 
local law conflicts with a matter of “statewide concern.”120  Each 
jurisdiction has its own test for determining when a local law created 
under Home Rule conflicts with state law, but courts typically look to 
at least three factors:  whether the law affects a matter of (1) “local 
concern,” (2) “statewide concern,” or (3) mixed matters of local and 
                                               
 117. See 149 U.S. 465, 468 (“The city is in a very just sense an ‘imperium in imperio.’”); 
see also STEVENSON, supra note 23, § 21.02 (explaining that imperio provisions “grant broad 
independent powers” that local governments can exercise within their defined sphere). 
 118. CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 5(a) (emphasis added). 
 119. WIS. CONST. art. XI, § 3(1). 
 120. City of Santa Clara v. Von Raesfeld, 474 P.2d 976, 979 (Cal. 1970) (en banc) 
(“When it appears that a municipal regulation and a general state law are in conflict, 
the controlling law will depend on whether the subject matter is a municipal affair or 
whether it is of statewide concern.”); see also City of Denver v. Sweet, 329 P.2d 441, 446 
(Colo. 1958) (en banc) (acknowledging that a Home Rule city’s ability to implement 
an income tax can only be limited if it conflicts with either a constitutional amendment 
or a matter of statewide concern); Adler v. Deegan, 167 N.E. 705, 714 (N.Y. 1929) 
(Cardozo, J., concurring) (“The power of the city is subordinate at such times to the 
power of the state, but may be exerted without restraint to the extent that the two can 
work in harmony together.”). 
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statewide concern.121  In City of Longmont v. Colorado Oil & Gas Ass’n,122 
the Supreme Court of Colorado considered whether a local ban on 
fracking, enacted under the flag of Colorado Home Rule, was 
preempted by state law.123  The court held that fracking is a statewide 
concern because of both the need for statewide uniformity in 
regulating the industry and fracking’s impact on areas outside local 
control.124  The Longmont court also acknowledged that factors such as 
whether the matter at issue is explicitly addressed by the state’s 
constitution and the extent of traditional regulatory practices can also 
guide the preemption inquiry inherent to Home Rule.125  Ultimately, 
each state’s Home Rule analysis is unique, but even where a Home 
Rule statute confers extremely broad authority to local government, 
local authority is not entirely unchecked. 
2. Express preemption Home Rule constructions 
As compared to imperio Home Rule provisions, many statutory 
constructions of Home Rule explicitly acknowledge that state law 
preempts Home Rule.126  New York, for example, grants “every local 
government . . . [the] power to adopt and amend local laws not 
inconsistent with the . . . [state] constitution or any general law . . . .”127  
Alaska’s Home Rule construction is similar to New York’s, in granting 
                                               
 121. See City of Longmont v. Colo. Oil & Gas Ass’n, 369 P.3d 573, 580 (Colo. 2016) 
(en banc) (considering whether a local ordinance related to municipal affairs, 
statewide concern, or a mixed matter of local and statewide concern in determining 
whether it was preempted by state law); Madison Teachers, Inc. v. Walker, 851 N.W.2d 
337, 368 (Wis. 2014) (acknowledging that a Home Rule analysis contemplates whether 
a local law is a matter of statewide concern, local concern, or a “mixed bag” (quoting 
Adams v. State Livestock Facilities Siting Review Bd., 820 N.W.2d 404, 463 (Wis. 
2012))).  Some states have more nuanced Home Rule analyses.  For example, 
California employs a multi-step test to determine whether a local law enacted under 
California’s imperio provision is preempted by state law.  See State Bldg. & Constr. 
Trades Council v. City of Vista, 279 P.3d 1022, 1027 (Cal. 2012).  California courts must 
(1) determine whether the local law impacts a local matter, (2) find that a conflict 
exists between local and state law, (3) examine whether the conflicting state law 
addresses a matter of state-wide concern, and (4) analyze whether the state law is 
related to the statewide concern and whether the state law is “narrowly tailored” to 
avoid meddling in matters of local importance.  Id. 
 122. 369 P.3d 573 (Col. 2016) (en banc). 
 123. Id. at 577. 
 124. Id. at 580. 
 125. Id. 
 126. STEVENSON, supra note 23, § 21.02. 
 127. N.Y. CONST. art IX, § 2(c)(i) (emphasis added). 
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that “[a] home rule borough or city may exercise all legislative powers 
not prohibited by law or by charter.”128 
When state law preempts local law created under Home Rule, the 
local law is typically invalidated.  However, when there is no state 
legislation in conflict with the local law, the local law applies.129  In the 
context of a Home Rule construction similar to New York or Alaska, 
including an explicit preemption provision, a local law can be 
preempted in one of three ways:  (1) when the local law is expressly 
prohibited by state law, (2) when the local law is in direct conflict with 
state law, or (3) when state law occupies the field.130  Performing a 
preemption analysis in this context, courts may determine that state 
law preempts local law if any of these three factors are met.  In City of 
Baltimore v. Sitnick,131 for example, the Maryland Court of Appeals 
considered the validity of a Baltimore ordinance enacted pursuant to 
the state’s Home Rule construction allowing cities to craft their own 
laws consistent with state statute.132  The court in Sitnick looked to 
                                               
 128. ALASKA CONST. art. X, § 11 (emphasis added). 
 129. See Palm v. 2800 Lake Shore Drive Condo. Ass’n, 988 N.E.2d 75, 81 (Ill. 2013) 
(“If the legislature intends to limit or deny the exercise of home rule powers, the 
statute must contain an express statement to that effect.”); Tri-Nel Mgmt., Inc. v. Bd. 
of Health, 741 N.E.2d 37, 43 (Mass. 2001) (acknowledging that a local law is only 
invalidated where it is in “sharp conflict” with state statute (quoting Take Five Vending, 
Ltd. v. Town of Provincetown, 615 N.E.2d 576, 578 (Mass. 1993))); Am. Cancer Soc’y 
v. State, 103 P.3d 1085, 1090 (Mont. 2004) (holding that a local no-smoking ordinance 
did not conflict with the state constitution because it was not expressly preempted); 
New Mexicans for Free Enter. v. City of Santa Fe, 126 P.3d 1149, 1159 (N.M. Ct. App. 
2005) (considering whether a local ordinance increasing the municipal minimum 
wage requirement was in express conflict with the New Mexico state minimum wage 
statute); Wholesale Laundry Bd. of Trade, Inc. v. City of New York, 234 N.Y.S.2d 862, 
864–65 (N.Y. App. Div. 1962) (invalidating a city’s minimum wage law prohibiting 
employment because it was inconsistent with state law), aff’d, 189 N.E.2d 623 (N.Y. 
1963); Fross v. County of Allegheny, 20 A.3d 1193, 1203 (Pa. 2011) (“[L]ocal 
legislation cannot permit what a state statute or regulation forbids or prohibit what 
state enactments allow.” (quoting Huntley & Huntley, Inc. v. Borough Council, 964 
A.2d 855, 862 (Pa. 2009))).  There are also instances where states have included 
“express anti-preemption” provisions in Home Rule statutes, which “expressly disclaim 
any intent on the part of the State legislature to preempt local regulation.”  STEVENSON, 
supra note 23, § 22.02; see also City of San Jose v. Dep’t of Health Servs., 77 Cal. Rptr. 
2d 609, 612 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (considering whether a city smoking ordinance was 
preempted in light of California code stipulating the legislative intent of a statute was 
“not to preempt the field of regulation of the smoking of tobacco” (quoting CAL. 
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 118910(a) (West 2016))). 
 130. STEVENSON, supra note 23, § 22.02. 
 131. 255 A.2d. 376 (1969). 
 132. Id. at 377–79. 
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whether the ordinance was explicitly preempted by state law, ultimately 
holding that it was not.133  The court also examined the degree of 
potential conflict between the ordinance and state law, determining 
that there was no conflict because “the ordinance s[ought] to 
accomplish precisely the same purpose as . . . the state law.”134  The 
Sitnick court concluded its preemption analysis by examining previous 
iterations of the state minimum wage law, as well as other related laws 
that might have indicated the legislature’s intent to limit local 
authority in some way, deciding that there was no evidence of 
legislative intent to preempt the field of wage regulation.135  Since all 
three prongs of the preemption analysis failed in Sitnick, the court 
concluded that the local ordinance was legitimate because it was not 
in conflict with state law.136 
3. Home Rule charters 
In states that employ charters to define the scope of local 
government authority, charters themselves can serve to both limit and 
expand the authority of local government officials.137  For example, the 
Michigan Home Rule construction requires certain provisions to be 
included in city charters, but it explicitly allows localities some 
discretion to include other provisions.138  Michigan Home Rule is 
particularly interesting because it requires that all city charters provide 
a mechanism for local government to enter intergovernmental 
contracts to the extent allowable by law.139  The California charter 
system, by comparison, is specifically established for the citizens of a 
county to adopt a charter whereby they can define their own laws.140  
Given the ability to enact laws through charters, localities are able to 
craft policy as narrowly or broadly as they see fit, as long as they account 
for any relevant preemption considerations.  In other words, a charter 
can limit the power of local officials in the same way it can expand local 
authority, depending on how the charter itself is written.  
                                               
 133. Id. at 379, 385. 
 134. Id. at 384. 
 135. Id. at 377–79. 
 136. Id. at 385. 
 137. STEVENSON, supra note 23, § 23.03 (“Charters are . . . limitations upon the 
power of local governments in practically all home rule states.”). 
 138. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 45.514–45.515 (West 2017). 
 139. § 45.514(j). 
 140. See Bank v. Bell, 217 P. 538, 542 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1923) (explaining how the 
California charter system is established to give “freeholders” the power to define their 
own government). 
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Furthermore, with varying degrees of discretion to define the terms of 
a charter can come varying content within charters themselves.141 
E.    Sheriffs and Local Contracting Authority 
The function of the sheriff in the United States derives from the English 
feudal system, and the office can be traced as far back as the ninth 
century.142  The sheriff became a particularly prevalent figure in American 
law enforcement on the western frontier during the 1800s as an important 
law enforcement figure in remote areas of the contemporary United 
States, and Hollywood has reinforced the image of the sheriff as an icon 
of the old west.143  The sheriff remains an important law enforcement 
officer in many jurisdictions in the United States today,144 and seventy-one 
sheriffs’ offices have entered 287(g) agreements with ICE, which 
constitutes the vast majority of 287(g) agreements nationwide.145 
                                               
 141. STEVENSON, supra note 23, § 21.02. 
 142. Roger Scott, “Roots” a Historical Perspective of the Office of Sheriff, NAT’L SHERIFFS’ 
ASS’N, https://www.sheriffs.org/publications-resources/resources/office-of-sheriff 
(last visited Feb. 5, 2019) (“The duties of the sheriff included keeping the peace, 
collecting taxes, maintaining jails, arresting fugitives, maintaining a list of wanted 
criminals, and serving orders and writs for the Kings Court.”). 
 143. Why Is the American Sheriff Such a Polarising Figure?, THE ECONOMIST (Apr. 11, 
2018), https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2018/04/11/why-is-the-
american-sheriff-such-a-polarising-figure; see also Soraya K. Kawucha, Sheriffs—The 
Other Police 99–100, 108–11 (Dec. 2014) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Sam 
Houston State University) (describing the role of the sheriff in the wild west and 
providing an overview of famous sheriffs and the outlaws they pursued). 
 144. History of the Sheriff, N.C. SHERIFFS’ ASS’N, https://ncsheriffs.org/about/history-
of-the-sheriff (last visited Feb. 5, 2019) (describing the “proud history” of the sheriff).  
President Ronald Reagan once addressed the National Sheriffs’ Association, saying: 
Thank you for standing up for this nation’s dream of personal freedom under the 
rule of law.  Thank you for standing against those who would transform that dream 
into a nightmare of wrongdoing and lawlessness.  And thank you for your service 
to your communities, to your country, and to the cause of law and justice. 
PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES:  RONALD REAGAN 1984 884 
(1986).  The Virginia Supreme Court has acknowledged that “[t]he office of sheriff is 
a most important one . . . the advent of that functionary known as the sheriff . . . 
occurred when William the Conqueror found himself military master of Britain.”  
Narrows Grocery Co. v. Bailey, 170 S.E. 730, 732 (Va. 1933). 
 145. See ICE Section 287(g), supra note 19 (detailing the seventy-one 287(g) agreements 
with sheriff’s offices out of the seventy-eight total 287(g) agreements nationwide). 
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1. The office of the sheriff 
Sheriffs today are typically elected local government officials 
charged with some type of law enforcement function.146  North 
Carolina sheriffs, for example, are officers empowered by the state 
constitution and elected by county constituents to serve four-year 
terms.147  Similarly, a sheriff in Virginia has “duties . . . [which] shall be 
prescribed by general law or special act.”148  The powers of the Texas 
sheriff are similar to those of the Virginia sheriff in that they are 
defined by the state constitution and “shall be prescribed by the 
Legislature.”149  Colorado sheriffs are considered “peace officers” 
charged with enforcing all laws of the state,150 while New Jersey sheriffs 
attend to security functions of the judiciary, serve court process, and 
investigate and apprehend criminals.151  Each state has its own specific 
mandate for the office of the sheriff, but there is substantial overlap in 
general duties and responsibilities across jurisdictions. 
State legislatures often assign sheriffs specific duties and 
responsibilities through state law.  For example, a sheriff might be 
tasked with managerial responsibilities allowing him to effectively 
supervise his deputies.152  Some states, such as North Carolina, 
Oklahoma, and Virginia, also empower sheriffs to oversee the local jail 
or county prisoners.153  In some instances, sheriffs can be assigned 
narrow, miscellaneous duties that the state legislature deems 
particularly important or necessary to the sheriff’s role.154  In 
Oklahoma, for instance, sheriffs are expressly granted authority to 
charge five dollars as a finger-printing fee,155 and North Carolina 
                                               
 146. THE ECONOMIST, supra note 143. 
 147. N.C. CONST. art. VII, § 2. 
 148. VA. CONST. art. VII, § 4. 
 149. TEX. CONST. art. V, § 23. 
 150. COLO. REV. STAT. 16-2.5-103 (2018). 
 151. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40A:9-117.6 (West 1984). 
 152. See David N. Falcone & L. Edward Wells, The County Sheriff as a Distinctive 
Policing Modality, 14 AM. J. POLICE 123, 130–33 (1995).  Nebraska explicitly confers 
authority to sheriffs to hire deputies and delegate responsibility, and Oregon provides 
sheriffs with statutory power to administer their office.  NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-
1704.02 (West 2018); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 206.210 (West 2018). 
 153. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 162-22 (West 2018); OKLA. ST. ANN. tit. 19, § 513 (West 
2018); VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-116.2 (West 1994). 
 154. Sheriffs’ associations often provide a repository of state laws and regulations 
applicable to sheriffs.  E.g., Frequently Used Code Sections, VA. SHERIFFS’ ASS’N, https://vasheriff. 
org/laws-and-legislation/frequently-used-code-sections (last visited Feb. 5, 2019). 
 155. OKLA. ST. ANN. tit. 19, § 514.3. 
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provides sheriffs with the ability to establish a volunteer school 
resource officer program for school safety.156  Ultimately, the specific 
responsibilities of the sheriff can differ from state to state, but the 
commonality across the country is that sheriffs are typically empowered 
with their authority through specific provisions of state legislation. 
2. Contracting authority at the local level 
States typically provide express authority for local government to 
enter contracts with outside entities, but that power is often vested in 
a local official other than the sheriff.  County judges in Arkansas are 
delegated signing authority to enter contracts involving the allocation 
of local funds,157 and the Texas Supreme Court has recognized the 
County Commissioners’ Court as the authorized signatory for external 
contracts at the local level.158  Comparatively, the express authority to 
enter contracts on behalf of a Montana county is reserved for the 
“board of county commissioners or by agents and officers acting under 
their authority or authority of law.”159  California authorizes the 
“legislative body” of local agencies to contract with other local 
government entities,160 meaning “the board of supervisors . . . the city 
council or board of trustees . . . and the board of directors or other 
governing body . . . .”161  Similarly, authority to enter agreements with 
the federal government to furnish law enforcement services in Virginia 
is explicitly assigned to “localities,”162 and Virginia code is clear that 
localities “shall be construed to mean a county, city, or town as the 
context may require.”163  Furthermore, the legal governing body of 
each Virginia locality is granted all powers endowed upon localities by 
Virginia code.164  In the same way states ascribe specific powers to 
sheriffs, states typically authorize specific local officials to contract on 
behalf of their locality. 
                                               
 156. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 162-26. 
 157. ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-14-1102(b)(2)(c)(ii) (West 2018). 
 158. Anderson v. Wood, 152 S.W.2d 1084, 1085 (Tex. 1941). 
 159. MONT. CODE ANN. § 7-1-2104 (West 2017). 
 160. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 54981 (West 2018). 
 161. § 53000. 
 162. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-1726 (West 1997). 
 163. § 15.2-102. 
 164. § 15.2-1401. 
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F.    Federal Preemption 
The issue of federal preemption of state law is a complex and 
prevalent topic in the immigration debate today,165 and the issue is 
relevant to Dillon’s Rule because it could be argued that § 287(g) 
preempts the outcome of a Dillon analysis in this context.  
Furthermore, the issue of preemption is particularly tricky here 
because Dillon’s Rule deals with what the law does not say,166 rather 
than an express provision of state law in conflict with federal law.167 
Under preemption principles, where state and federal law conflict, 
federal law governs.168  However, where there is no conflict, state law 
applies.169  In the immigration context, Arizona v. United States170 serves 
as modern guidance for courts in deciding preemption issues.  In 2010, 
Arizona enacted the Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe 
Neighborhoods Act (SB 1070), making certain activity by 
undocumented immigrants a misdemeanor and expanding the legal 
authority of state law enforcement to detain suspected undocumented 
immigrants.171  The United States brought suit to enjoin Arizona from 
implementing SB 1070, arguing that the law was preempted by federal 
statute.172  Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy explained 
federalism principles to fundamentally stipulate that states and the 
                                               
 165. E.g., Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 416 (2012) (finding preemption 
of an Arizona statute (S.B. 1070) creating criminal penalties for unlawful entry); City 
of New York v. United States, 179 F.3d 29, 31 (2d Cir. 1999) (finding that federal law 
preempted a mayoral executive order establishing a sanctuary city). 
 166. See supra Section II.C (describing how Dillon’s Rule precludes local 
government from having authority not provided by state legislation). 
 167. E.g., Arizona, 567 U.S. at 407–10 (invalidating an Arizona law that granted state 
law enforcement the authority to make warrantless arrests based on a belief that the 
individual was in the country illegally because it conflicted with federal immigration 
law and was thus unconstitutional). 
 168. See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1, 210 (1824) (“States may sometimes 
enact laws, the validity of which depends on their interfering with, and being contrary to, 
an act of Congress passed in pursuance of the constitution . . . .  Should [a] collision exist . 
. . the acts of [a state] must yield to the law of Congress . . . .”); Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade 
Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372 (2000) (“A fundamental principle of the Constitution is that 
Congress has the power to preempt state law.”). 
 169. See Arizona, 567 U.S. at 414 (citing United States v. Di Re, 332 U. S. 581, 589 
(1948)) (noting that where state law is not adverse to federal law, it survives 
preemption); Crosby, 530 U.S. at 372 (describing how federal law only preempts state 
law when state law conflicts with federal law). 
 170. 567 U.S. 387 (2012). 
 171. Id. at 393–94. 
 172. Id. at 393. 
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federal government are separate sovereigns with the potential to have 
competing legal interests.173  Justice Kennedy laid out the following 
principle to determine the preemption issue in the case:  “state laws 
are pre-empted when they conflict with federal law,” but the police 
powers of the states are presumed to be governing authority unless 
Congress clearly intended to supersede them.174  The Court went on to 
hold that provisions of SB 1070 in conflict with federal law were 
unconstitutional while those provisions not in conflict with federal law 
could remain legitimate legal authority.175 
III.   APPLICATION OF DILLON’S RULE TO SHERIFFS’ ABILITY  
TO ENTER 287(g) AGREEMENTS 
A.    287(g) Agreements are Contracts 
287(g) agreements constitute contracts between federal and local 
governments because they include consideration and the terms are clearly 
defined.176  In the case of a 287(g) MOA, the federal government agrees to 
provide training, cover certain costs of 287(g) program implementation, 
and delegate federal immigration enforcement authority to the LEA.177  
The LEA, by contrast, agrees to provide the human resources and facilities 
necessary to implement the agreement and entrust their officers to the 
supervision of the U.S. Attorney General.178  In this regard, 287(g) 
agreements are similar to the MOA in Praesidium Medical in that they define 
the terms of collaboration, how each party will benefit, and what the 
coordinated effort will look like in practice.179 
B.   The Extent of Sheriffs’ Authority to Enter 287(g) Agreements  
in a Dillon’s Rule State 
Under Dillon’s Rule, a sheriff must have express or implied authority 
to enter a 287(g) agreement, or such authority must be essential to the 
locality in question.  Sheriffs in different jurisdictions have different 
                                               
 173. Id. at 398. 
 174. Id. at 399–400. 
 175. Id. at 400–16. 
 176. See supra notes 51–54 and accompanying text (discussing court decisions 
applying contract law principles to MOAs). 
 177. See supra notes 71–73 and accompanying text (explaining the contents of a 
typical 287(g) MOA). 
 178. See supra notes 71–73 and accompanying text. 
 179. See supra notes 51–54 and accompanying text (providing a discussion of 
Praesidium Medical). 
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degrees of authority, and states tailor the mandate of their sheriffs in a 
way they feel best suits local needs.  However, Dillon’s Rule precludes 
sheriffs from entering 287(g) agreements in most instances. 
1. Express authority for a sheriff to enter a 287(g) agreement 
Under certain strict Dillon’s Rule constructions, a sheriff’s authority 
might be limited by the absence of express authority (i.e. implied or 
essential authority would not be enough).180  This strict application of 
a Dillon analysis would bar sheriffs from entering 287(g) agreements 
in states where they do not have any express authority to enter a 
contract with external law enforcement entities.181  For example, in 
Virginia, county governing bodies are endowed with the power to enter 
reciprocal agreements with the federal government, but there are no 
Virginia statutory provisions giving sheriffs any sort of explicit authority 
to contract with outside entities.182  Similarly, North Carolina does not 
provide sheriffs with any express statutory authority to enter agreements 
with the federal government.183  The Texas Supreme Court has even 
held that “a sheriff has no authority to make contracts that are binding 
on the county, except where he is specially so authorized to do by 
statute.”184  Several opinions issued by various Texas Attorneys General 
also assert that Texas sheriffs cannot enter reciprocal agreements with 
federal agencies, including agreements to house inmates (though none 
of these opinions directly address § 287(g)).185  Accordingly, in states 
                                               
 180. See Bowie Inn, Inc. v. City of Bowie, 335 A.2d 679, 689–90 (Md. 1975) (holding 
that a city ordinance to regulate garbage was expressly authorized by state statute and 
thus within the powers of the city); Novak v. Town of Poughkeepsie, 311 N.Y.S.2d 393, 
396 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1970) (concluding that a city ordinance was invalid because it 
“deviate[d] from the strict letter of the enabling statutes”); Reese v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 676 S.E.2d 481, 491 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009) (determining 
that a county had authority to sell real property because such authority was expressly 
vested in the county by state statute).  
 181. See supra notes 146–56 and accompanying text (outlining common duties of 
American sheriffs). 
 182. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-1729 (West 1997) (“The governing body of any county 
may enter into an agreement with the United States government or a department or 
agency thereof . . . .”).  Virginia code also provides that “the governing body of any 
contiguous locality . . . may enter into a mutual aid agreement with the appropriate 
federal authorities to authorize police cooperation and assistance.”  § 15.2-1728. 
 183. See generally N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 162-13–162-26 (2017) (codifying the duties 
of the sheriff in North Carolina). 
 184. Anderson v. Wood, 152 S.W.2d 1084, 1085 (Tex. 1941). 
 185. See Gregg Abbott, Attorney General of Texas, Opinion No. GA-0229 1, 7 (Aug. 
9, 2004) https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/opinions/opinions/50abbott/op/20
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recognizing this strict interpretation of Dillon’s Rule, where sheriffs do 
not have express authority to contract with the federal government, they 
may not be authorized to enter 287(g) agreements. 
2. Implied authority for a sheriff to enter a 287(g) agreement 
In a jurisdiction where a court would look beyond the first Dillon 
factor, sheriffs may have implied authority to enter 287(g) agreements, 
even in the absence of express authority to do so.186  For example, 
Virginia code allows a locality to enter a reciprocal agreement with the 
federal government.187  It could be argued that a sheriff, as a ranking 
law enforcement officer of a Virginia locality, has implied authority 
deriving from this state statutory provision to enter a 287(g) agreement 
on behalf of his locality.  However, Virginia code specifies that the 
governing body of a locality has all statutory powers conferred to 
localities,188 meaning that the board of supervisors or city council is 
authorized to enter 287(g) agreements, not the sheriff.189  Furthermore, 
                                               
04/pdf/ga0229.pdf (concluding that a sheriff does not have the authority to enter a 
contract to house federal prisoners); Jim Mattox, Attorney General of Texas, Letter 
Opinion No. 90-95 1, 4 (Nov. 27, 1990) https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/opini 
ons/opinions/47mattox/lo/1990/htm/lo1990095.htm (interpreting Texas code to 
preclude sheriffs from entering contracts to house federal prisoners); see also Greg 
Abbott, Attorney General of Texas, Opinion No. GA-0424 1, 4 (May 1, 2006) 
https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/opinions/opinions/50abbott/op/2006/pdf/
ga0424.pdf (advising that sheriffs “may exercise only those powers that the state 
constitution and statutes confer, either explicitly or implicitly”); Dan Morales, 
Attorney General of Texas, Letter Opinion No. 98-072 1 (Aug. 25, 1998) 
https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/opinions/opinions/48morales/lo/1998/pdf
/lo1998072.pdf (opining that the commissioners court, not the sheriff, has authority 
to contract with external entities). 
 186. See supra notes 98–101 and accompanying text (explaining the second Dillon 
factor).  While the court in Countryside Investment Co. determined that lack of express 
authority was sufficient to limit the power of local government, the opinion also 
acknowledged that local government authority can be implied.  See 522 S.E.2d. at 613.  
Thus, it stands to reason that a Virginia court might look beyond the first Dillon factor in 
its analysis.  Perhaps because Virginia is considered a quintessential Dillon’s Rule state, 
Virginia courts weigh the first factor more heavily than in other jurisdictions, further 
illustrating the lack of uniformity in how the doctrine can be applied.  See STEVENSON, supra 
note 23, § 24.03 (using Virginia as an example of strict interpretation of Dillon’s Rule). 
 187. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-1726 (West 2017). 
 188. § 15.2-1401. 
 189. § 15.2-102. 
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Virginia precedent is clear that the sheriff is considered a separate legal 
entity from the locality he represents.190   
Comparatively, in North Carolina, sheriffs have statutory power to 
receive and house prisoners delivered to county jails under the 
authority of the federal government.191  It could be argued that, by 
applying Perretta, this state law implies that sheriffs have authority to 
enter a 287(g) agreement because participation in the 287(g) program 
is a necessary means of performing this statutory responsibility.  
However, Perretta is distinguished from this scenario.  The court in 
Perretta held that a mayor’s ability to dismiss employees is implied from 
the mayor’s function as chief executive of the city because the express 
responsibility to manage the city’s finances implies authority to dismiss 
employees.192  Human resources have a direct financial value, and the 
inability to manage them would make financial management 
impossible.  But in North Carolina, the local governing body is charged 
with entering and ratifying contracts on behalf of the municipality.193  
The local governing body could still enter and ratify a 287(g) 
agreement on behalf of the sheriff and locality, and the sheriff would 
retain the powers necessary to detain federal prisoners under both 
§ 287(g) and North Carolina code.  Furthermore, the Perretta court 
considered the mayor’s power as chief executive to be quite broad,194 
which stands in contrast to sheriffs’ explicitly narrow mandate in many 
jurisdictions, including North Carolina.195  State legislatures assign 
certain local officials with express authority to contract on behalf of 
their locality for a reason, and sheriffs should not have implied 
authority deriving from the express authority of a different local 
official where sheriffs have their own specific statutory mandate.  Thus, 
in states where a sheriff’s scope of authority is similar to Virginia or 
                                               
 190. See Keathley v. Vitale, 866 F. Supp. 272, 275 (E.D. Va. 1994) (determining that 
just because a sheriff has discretion to make decisions impacting his municipality does 
not make those decisions municipal policy); see also Narrows Grocery Co. v. Bailey, 170 
S.E. 730, 733 (1933) (holding a sheriff personally liable for failure to perform a 
responsibility expressly assigned by the state legislature). 
 191. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 162-34 (West 2017). 
 192. See 440 A.2d 823, 829–30 (N.C. 1981). 
 193. See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 160A-12 (entering contracts); § 160A-16 (2017) 
(ratifying contracts). 
 194. See Perretta, 440 A.2d at 830 (holding that the city’s charter provides broad 
powers to the executive). 
 195. See supra notes 146–56 and accompanying text (detailing how state 
constitutions and legislation typically provide specific, narrow duties of sheriffs). 
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North Carolina, a sheriff’s ability to enter a 287(g) agreement cannot 
reasonably be implied from existing express statutory authority. 
3. Essential authority for a sheriff to enter a 287(g) agreement 
The final Dillon factor a court might consider in determining the 
extent of a sheriff’s authority to enter a 287(g) agreement concerns 
whether such power is essential to the locality the sheriff represents.196  
Entering a 287(g) agreement could be considered essential to 
effectively administer the office of the sheriff, similar to how the 
mayor’s authority to dismiss employees was deemed essential in 
Ennis.197  However, this argument is merely a weaker version of the 
contention that a sheriff’s ability to enter a 287(g) agreement is an 
implied power.198  As discussed above, there are typically other local 
officials empowered to contract with outside entities who could do so 
within the legal framework of state legislation, and many sheriffs 
throughout the country manage to perform their duties adequately 
without the added benefit of a 287(g) agreement.  It might be 
“convenient” for a sheriff to have a 287(g) agreement in place where it 
furthers local policy interests, but to say it is “essential” goes too far.199  
Moreover, the local oversight mechanism provided in states where a 
specific county representative is empowered to contract on behalf of his 
locality should be considered integral to maintaining the balance of 
power between state and local governments.  If sheriffs were meant to 
have such authority, state legislatures would provide it.  To simply 
disregard this important accountability function would be a slight against 
a fundamental check on government authority at the municipal level. 
By comparison, an argument applying Willson would have to adopt 
the position that it is essential for a sheriff to be able to enter a 
287(g) agreement to protect a locality’s citizens.200  The logic would 
have to be similar to that of a public official diverting stream water to 
prevent emergency flooding, which is the issue the court considered 
                                               
 196. See supra notes 106–13 and accompanying text (outlining the third factor of 
Dillon’s Rule). 
 197. See State ex rel. Ennis v. Superior Court, 279 P. 601, 606 (Wash. 1929). 
 198. See supra notes 114–16 and accompanying text (discussing the ambiguity 
between the second and third Dillon factors). 
 199. Homebuilders Ass’n of Charlotte, Inc. v. City of Charlotte, 442 S.E.2d 45, 49 
(N.C. 1994) (quoting J. DILLON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL 
CORPORATIONS, § 237 (5th ed. 1911)) (delineating the powers of municipal 
corporations as those that are expressly granted, fairly implied, or essential to the 
accomplishment of the purposes of the corporation). 
 200. See supra notes 109–11 and accompanying text (discussing Willson). 
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in Willson.201  Proponents of strict immigration policy would likely make 
an argument comparing an uncontrolled river to the danger 
supposedly created by undocumented immigration.  While this 
position makes for a powerful metaphor, the argument is easily 
countered.  Empirical data suggests that undocumented immigrants 
are actually less likely to commit crimes in the United States than 
native-born Americans.202  One report even goes as far as to suggest 
that there could be a correlation between the increased immigration 
rate in recent years and a drop in crime.203 
While there are policy arguments to be made on both sides of the 
political spectrum, one thing is clear:  a loose application of the third 
Dillon factor should not be allowed to run afoul of the U.S. system of 
federalism. In particular, state officials should not be able to 
circumvent well-established legal principles to further their own 
political or personal interests.  By its very nature, Dillon’s Rule exists 
to prevent exactly that from happening.  Allowing sheriffs to continue 
to unilaterally enter 287(g) agreements sets precedent that could allow 
ICE and local law enforcement to establish local bastions of federal 
authority irrespective of state governments’ intent simply because they 
believe it to be good public policy.  The same thing could conceivably 
happen with any issue creating tension between state and federal 
law.204  Because sheriffs are elected officials, and the Attorney General 
                                               
 201. See Willson v. Boise City, 55 P. 887, 889 (Idaho 1899). 
 202. See, e.g., Nazgol Ghandnoosh & Josh Rovner, Immigration and Public Safety, 
SENT’G PROJECT 6–7 (2017), http://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
2017/03/Immigration-and-Public-Safety.pdf (reporting that immigrants as a group 
have lower rates of arrests than native born Americans); Michelangelo Landgrave & 
Alex Nowrasteh, “Criminal Immigrants Their Numbers, Demographics, and Countries of 
Origin,” CATO INSTIT. 1 (Mar. 15, 2017), https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/fi 
les/pubs/pdf/immigration_brief-1.pdf (finding that native-born Americans are more likely 
to be incarcerated and that crime rates decrease in areas with high immigrant settlements). 
 203. Ghandnoosh & Rovner, supra note 202, at 89.  Any argument that 
undocumented immigrants may negatively affect the U.S. economy is also easily refuted.  
See Brennan Hoban, Do Immigrants “Steal” Jobs from American Workers?, BROOKINGS (Aug. 
24, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/brookings-now/2017/08/24/do-immig 
rants-steal-jobs-from-american-workers (noting that immigration positively impacts the 
American economy); see also NAT’L ACAD. SCIS. ENG’G, MED., THE ECONOMIC AND FISCAL 
CONSEQUENCES OF IMMIGRATION 197–200 (2017) (discussing how immigration can 
positively and negatively impact the American economy). 
 204. See, e.g., Willis v. Winters, 253 P.3d 1058, 1068 (Or. 2011) (rejecting sheriffs’ 
arguments that a federal law making marijuana consumption illegal did not entitle them 
to deny a concealed handgun license under state law); c.f., Barr v. Snohomish Cty. 
Sheriff, 419 P.3d 867, 869 (Wash. Ct. App. 2018) (finding that a sheriff, who attempted 
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is a political appointee, incentives exist for sheriffs to partner with the 
federal government to enforce policy impacting any popular political 
issue, be it immigration, gun control, marijuana enforcement, or other 
similarly divisive policy matters.205  However, the federal government 
cannot be allowed to enlist the assistance of local law enforcement 
where it would infringe on states’ sovereignty.206  Accordingly, any 
judicial decision turning on the third Dillon factor should not include 
an outcome conflicting with the dual sovereignty of states and the 
federal government because such a holding would have 
unconstitutional implications.  This argument is reinforced in the 
context of 287(g) agreements by the express anti-preemption provision 
in § 287(g),207 indicating Congress’ intent to defer to state law.  
Furthermore, the third Dillon factor should be applied narrowly,208 
especially when its implications could adversely affect the constitutional 
rights of either states or individuals.209 
C.    Reconciling Dillon’s Rule and Home Rule 
While it is likely Dillon’s Rule would limit a sheriff’s authority to enter 
a 287(g) agreement, it is possible that a local law enacted under a Home 
Rule statute might offset Dillon’s Rule and serve to empower sheriffs to 
enter 287(g) agreements.210  For example, a local law or charter in a 
Home Rule state might explicitly authorize a sheriff to enter an 
intergovernmental agreement with ICE.  After all, Michigan charters are 
                                               
to enforce both state and federal law with his actions, was prohibited from denying a 
concealed pistol license to an individual with two sealed juvenile felony adjudications). 
 205. See Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 
YALE L.J. 1256, 1281–84 (noting examples of tension in law when it comes to 
cooperation between states and the federal government). 
 206. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 933 (1997) (holding that a provision 
of the Brady Act requiring state law enforcement to participate in federal gun 
regulation was unconstitutional because it violated state sovereignty); see also Arizona 
v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 398 (2012) (“Federalism, central to the constitutional 
design, adopts the principle that both the National and State Governments have 
elements of sovereignty the other is bound to respect.” (citing Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 
U.S. 452, 457 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring))). 
 207. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(1) (2012) (requiring that 287(g) MOAs are entered “to the 
extent consistent with State and local law”). 
 208. See supra notes 106–13 and accompanying text (acknowledging that there are 
few examples where the third Dillon factor has been applied by courts). 
 209. See supra notes 79–87 and accompanying text (explaining how detention of 
undocumented immigrants by state level law enforcement in the absence of at 287(g) 
agreement infringes on constitutional rights). 
 210. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
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expressly required under the Michigan Home Rule to provide a 
mechanism for intergovernmental contracts,211 so it is feasible that a 
Michigan locality’s charter could authorize a sheriff to fulfill that 
function.  However, any charter or local law enacted under Home Rule 
providing such authority would still have to withstand a preemption 
analysis because there would be no limitation on the outcome of a Dillon 
analysis if Home Rule is preempted.212  Where a local law or charter is 
preempted by state law, it is invalidated,213 and Dillon’s Rule would thus 
serve to limit a sheriff’s authority in states recognizing the doctrine.  
1. Intrastate preemption analysis:  Imperio Home Rule constructions 
In an imperio Home Rule state,214 it is likely a sheriff’s authority would 
be considered an issue of “statewide concern”215 because sheriffs 
oftentimes derive their powers explicitly from the state legislature.216  
As the Longmont court acknowledged, mentioning an issue explicitly in 
a state constitution indicates an area of “statewide concern.”217  The 
same goes for an issue within a category of traditional regulatory 
                                               
 211. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 45.514(j)-(k) (West 2017). 
 212. See supra Sections II.C, II.D. 
 213. See, e.g., Palm v. 2800 Lake Shore Drive Condo. Ass’n, 988 N.E.2d 75, 81 (Ill. 
2013) (“If the legislature intends to limit or deny the exercise of home rule powers, 
the statute must contain an express statement to that effect.”); Tri-Nel Mgmt. v. Bd. of 
Health, 741 N.E.2d 37, 43 (Mass. 2001) (acknowledging that a local law is only 
invalidated where it is in “sharp conflict” with state statute (quoting Take Five Vending, 
Ltd. v. Town of Provincetown, 415 Mass. 741, 744 (1993))); Am. Cancer Soc’y v. State, 
103 P.3d 1085, 1090 (Mont. 2004) (holding that a local no-smoking ordinance was not 
in violation of the Montana state constitution because it was not expressly preempted 
by the constitution); New Mexicans for Free Enter. v. City of Santa Fe, 126 P.3d 1149, 
1155 (N.M. Ct. App. 2005) (considering whether a local ordinance increasing the 
municipal minimum wage requirement was in express conflict with the New Mexico 
state minimum wage statute); Wholesale Laundry Bd. of Trade, Inc. v. City of New 
York, 234 N.Y.S.2d 862, 865 (N.Y. App. Div. 1962) (holding that a city minimum wage 
law prohibiting employment at a salary which state law permitted was inconsistent with 
state law and thus invalid); Fross v. County of Allegheny, 20 A.3d 1193, 1203 (Pa. 2011) 
(“[L]ocal legislation cannot permit what a state statute or regulation forbids or 
prohibit what state enactments allow.” (quoting Huntley & Huntley, Inc. v. Borough 
Council, 964 A.2d 855, 862 (Pa. 2009))). 
 214. The imperio Home Rule construction allows local governments wide discretion to 
determine their own rules and laws without any express limitation.  See supra Section II.D.1.  
 215. City of Longmont v. Colo. Oil & Gas Ass’n, 369 P.3d 573, 580 (Colo. 2016). 
 216. See supra notes 146–56 and accompanying text (providing examples of 
statutory power explicitly vested in sheriffs in various states). 
 217. City of Longmont, 369 P.3d at 581. 
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practice.218  Sheriffs are frequently endowed with their authority from 
state constitutions, and defining the scope of law enforcement 
authority falls within a traditional state-level regulatory practice,219 
indicating that a Home Rule provision empowering a sheriff with 
authority to enter a 287(g) agreement would thus conflict with an area 
of “statewide concern.”220  Furthermore, due process considerations 
dictate that there is a clear need for statewide uniformity in law 
enforcement, especially when constitutional rights are at risk, which is 
likely the reason sheriffs are so often empowered through state code 
or constitution and not local laws or charters.  Accordingly, a local law 
or charter granting a sheriff with additional powers under an imperio 
Home Rule construction would be preempted in this scenario. 
2. Intrastate preemption analysis:  Express preemption Home Rule 
       constructions 
In states where the Home Rule statute includes an explicit 
preemption provision, it is even more likely that state law would 
preempt a local charter granting sheriffs with authority to enter 
287(g) agreements.  Including an express preemption provision as 
part of a Home Rule statute makes clear the legislature’s intent to 
retain supremacy over local laws.  In states where the sheriff’s mandate 
is expressly established by the state legislature alone,221 a charter 
granting a sheriff additional authority could be construed as expressly 
prohibited by state law using the Maryland Court of Appeals’ 
preemption test set forth in Sitnick.222  It is unlikely a given state’s code 
would include a provision explicitly stating that, for example, “local 
government shall not dictate the sheriff’s responsibilities.”  However, 
reserving the exclusive power for the legislature to define a sheriff’s 
scope of authority arguably serves the same purpose. 
Even if a sheriff’s statutory mandate was not considered to be expressly 
prohibited by state law in this manner, it is likely a charter empowering a 
sheriff to enter a 287(g) agreement would still conflict with state law 
                                               
 218. Id. 
 219. See supra notes 146–56 and accompanying text (demonstrating how sheriffs 
derive their authority from state constitutions and state code). 
 220. City of Longmont, 369 P.3d at 580. 
 221. E.g., TEX. CONST. art. V, § 23 (defining the scope of sheriffs’ authority to be 
“prescribed by the Legislature”). 
 222. See City of Baltimore v. Sitnick, 255 A.2d 376, 377 (Md. 1969) (considering 
whether a local law was expressly prohibited by state legislation). 
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under the Sitnick test.223  If a state legislature lays out specific duties and 
responsibilities for the sheriff through state code, a local law or charter 
empowering a sheriff to do something more than he is already authorized 
to do would expand the scope of the sheriff’s authority beyond that which 
the legislature intended.  A local law or charter of this kind would thus 
not seek to achieve the same end as state legislation, which runs contrary 
to the outcome of the Sitnick preemption analysis.224 
In the unlikely event that both of the first Sitnick factors were to fail 
a preemption test in this context, a court might still determine that 
there is legislative intent to preempt the field of regulating law 
enforcement.225  As with all Sitnick factors, this might vary from state to 
state depending on the sheriff’s statutory or constitutional mandate, 
but it stands to reason that empowering a sheriff through state 
legislation implies state legislatures’ intent to regulate the duties and 
responsibilities of the sheriff’s office.  If state legislatures were 
unconcerned with regulating sheriffs’ authority, they could more 
explicitly delegate local governments with the ability to define the 
scope of a sheriff’s authority in localities where Home Rule applies. 
Regardless of the merits of a Home Rule preemption analysis, it seems 
unlikely many Home Rule charters or local laws nationwide empower 
sheriffs to enter 287(g) agreements.  It is so common for an official other 
than the sheriff to have statutory authority to enter contracts with 
external entities that it would be unnecessary for a local law or charter 
to address the issue to begin with.226  Additionally, Home Rule acts as a 
check on local power insofar as it empowers local citizens to define the 
scope of local officials’ authority.227  In the same way a local law or 
charter might explicitly empower a sheriff to enter a 287(g) agreement, 
it is equally possible for it to prohibit the exercise of such authority. 
D.    Sheriffs’ Agency to Enter 287(g) Agreements 
To make a 287(g) agreement binding, a sheriff unilaterally entering 
into a 287(g) agreement would need actual or apparent authority to 
                                               
 223. See supra notes 131–36 and accompanying text (discussing the Sitnick preemption test). 
 224. See Sitnick, 255 A.2d at 384 (holding that a local law was legitimate because it 
sought to accomplish the same goal as a state statute). 
 225. See id. at 322 (analyzing whether the state legislature intended to regulate the 
field as the third prong of a preemption analysis). 
 226. See supra notes 157–64 and accompanying text (describing typical officials 
endowed with authority to contract on behalf of their locality). 
 227. See supra notes 137–41 and accompanying text (laying out Home Rule’s 
limitation on local authority). 
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contract on behalf of the locality he represents.228  When it comes to 
actual authority, a sheriff may only enter a 287(g) agreement if such 
authority is granted to him by state legislation.  Like the insurance 
salesman in Merrill or the government employee in Richmond, sheriffs 
cannot bind the local governmental entities they represent by entering 
a contract where they are not expressly authorized to do so.229  
Moreover, in the same way the government employee in Richmond 
mistakenly gave faulty information,230 a sheriff mistakenly believing he 
has authority to enter a 287(g) agreement still does not justify 
overstepping the framework of his authority.  In that regard, the 
application of agency principles through the lens of Dillon’s Rule 
indicates sheriffs do not have express authority to enter agreements 
with the federal government in most instances.231  
Similarly, county sheriffs would only have apparent authority if the 
principal (i.e., the locality they represent) overtly manifested to ICE 
(as the third party) the will or intention for sheriffs to have authority 
to contract with the federal government.232  Because the vast majority 
of 287(g) agreements are signed solely by sheriffs,233 a court applying 
agency principles would have to consider evidence to suggest the 
locality in question had made a manifestation towards ICE that might 
cause ICE to actually and reasonably believe that sheriffs have authority 
to enter contracts.  While it is possible localities might make such 
manifestations towards ICE, agency principles would need to be 
applied on a case-by-case basis, and it seems that ICE relies on § 287(g) 
itself as the legal justification granting sheriffs authority to enter 
MOAs.234  Additionally, § 287(g) is a representation of Congress’ 
intention, not the intention of the localities that sheriffs represent.  An 
apparent authority argument thus does not work in this scenario.  
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has been clear in narrowly 
construing the agency of government officials, meaning that an 
                                               
 228. See supra Section II.A (providing a basic discussion of agency theory). 
 229. See supra notes 63–70 and accompanying text (discussing Merrill and Richmond). 
 230. Office of Personnel Management v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 417–18 (1990). 
 231. See supra Section II.E (detailing common statutory authority of sheriffs). 
 232. See supra notes 55–61 and accompanying text (discussing apparent authority). 
 233. See ICE Section 287(g), supra note 19 (linking to all fully executed 287(g) 
agreements nationwide). 
 234. The ICE website incorrectly states that 287(g) agreements can be signed by 
“the head of the local agency carrying out the designated immigration law 
enforcement functions.”  Id. 
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apparent authority argument is likely irrelevant anyways.235  Ultimately, 
when sheriffs unilaterally enter 287(g) agreements that they are not 
authorized to enter, one of the parties to the agreement (i.e. the 
sheriff) does not have agency to bind the entity they represent, 
disabling the contractual instrument that a 287(g) MOA provides.236  
E.    Sheriffs’ Lack of Legal Privilege to Detain Individuals  
Under Invalid 287(g) Agreements 
Individuals detained under invalid 287(g) agreements deserve 
constitutional protections. Ochoa, Lunn, and Santos are clear in 
requiring written 287(g) agreements to be in place in order for local 
law enforcement to have authority to enforce federal immigration 
policy.237  Thus, an application of these cases precludes sheriffs from 
detaining individuals for federal immigration violations if there is no 
legitimate 287(g) agreement granting them that authority.238  
Accordingly, where local law enforcement detains suspected 
undocumented immigrants under federal immigration policy through 
an invalid 287(g) agreement, it is in violation of at least the Fourth and 
Fifth Amendments and possibly other laws.239 
F.    Federal Preemption in the Context of § 287(g) and Dillon’s Rule 
Section 287(g) does not preempt Dillon’s Rule and grant sheriffs the 
authority to enter 287(g) agreements because the plain language of 
§ 287(g) includes an express anti-preemption provision.  Specifically, 
§ 287(g) requires that 287(g) MOAs be executed “to the extent 
                                               
 235. See supra notes 63–70 and accompanying text (analyzing Merrill and Richmond 
as they determine the extent of agency of government officials). 
 236. See supra notes 55–61 and accompanying text (explaining that a contract where 
one of the parties does not have agency to bind the principal is unenforceable as a 
matter of law).  North Carolina even goes as far as to explicitly invalidate contracts 
made on behalf of cities, which are not ratified by the local governing body.  N.C. GEN. 
STAT. ANN. § 160A-16 (West 2017). 
 237. See supra notes 79–87 and accompanying text (discussing Ochoa, Lunn, and Santos). 
 238. See Santos v. Frederick County Bd. of Comm’rs, 725 F.3d 451, 465 (4th Cir. 2013) 
(reasoning that detention of an undocumented immigrant by state-level law 
enforcement without a 287(g) agreement is a Fourth Amendment violation); Ochoa v. 
Campbell, 266 F. Supp. 3d 1237, 1259 (E.D. Wash. 2017) (applying Fourth Amendment 
protections in the absence of a 287(g) agreement); Lunn v. Commonwealth, 78 N.E.3d 
1143, 1159–60 (Mass. 2017) (holding that state-level law enforcement cannot enforce 
federal immigration policy without a 287(g) agreement in place). 
 239. See, e.g., Ochoa, 226 F. Supp. 3d at 1255. 
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consistent with State and local law.”240  Dillon’s Rule is a doctrine 
dictated and recognized on a state-by-state basis.241  Thus, because 
Dillon’s Rule is state law, § 287(g) explicitly requires 287(g) MOAs to 
comply with limitations posed by Dillon’s Rule.242 
Even notwithstanding this explicit provision in § 287(g), the statute 
does not preempt the outcome of a Dillon analysis.  Section 287(g) 
does not address the contracting authority of the local official who 
enters the 287(g) agreement; all it says is that the U.S. Attorney 
General may delegate federal immigration responsibilities to an 
official he determines to be qualified.243  The statute does not specify 
who may sign a 287(g) MOA on behalf of the LEA,244 meaning states 
have the authority to make their own rules regarding 287(g) MOA 
signing authority because to do so would not conflict with § 287(g).245  
The local government signatory does not necessarily impact who the 
Attorney General delegates authority to.  Accordingly, § 287(g) would 
apply if an official who is authorized to enter a contract with the federal 
government, such as the county governing body or county judge, were 
to sign a 287(g) MOA.246  The statute does not conflict with the idea 
that the appropriate county signatory could enter the agreement on 
behalf of his locality, and the Attorney General would still have 
discretion to delegate authority to implement the agreement to 
whichever local official he deems appropriate.  However, authorized 
local signatories would be wise to think twice before binding their 
municipality to participate in a controversial program with major flaws 
identified by the Department of Homeland Security itself.247  
Furthermore, in many cases, sheriffs unilaterally enter these 
                                               
 240. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(1) (2012). 
 241. See supra Section II.C (discussing Dillon’s Rule). 
 242. § 1357(g); see also Sessions & Hayden, supra note 22, at 330 (noting that local 
law enforcement may make arrests for violations of federal crimes as long as they are 
not limited by local law from doing so). 
 243. § 1357(g)(1). 
 244. Id. 
 245. See Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 414 (2012) (citing United States v. 
Di Re., 332 U.S. 581, 589 (1948)) (acknowledging that where state and federal law are 
not in conflict, state law can govern). 
 246. See supra notes 157–64 and accompanying text (detailing how contracting 
authority at the local level is often vested in someone other than the sheriff). 
 247. See Eric Katz, ICE’s Expanded Use of Local Law Enforcement Came Without Adequate 
Planning or Resources, GOV’T EXECUTIVE (Sep. 24, 2018), https://www.govexec.com/ma 
nagement/2018/09/ices-expanded-use-local-law-enforcement-came-without-adequat 
e-planning-or-resources/151515 (referencing an ICE Inspector General report 
identifying human resources and IT shortcomings in the 287(g) program). 
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agreements,248 which is an abuse of their power as sheriffs where they 
are not authorized to enter contracts on behalf of their localities.  
Because § 287(g) does not address the question of signing authority of 
the LEA representative entering a MOA, but Dillon’s Rule limits who 
can sign agreements with the federal government, the rules do not 
conflict, and Dillon’s Rule applies. 
CONCLUSION 
The sheriff, as a local government official, is limited by Dillon’s Rule 
to the powers granted to him by state law.  Where a sheriff is not 
authorized by state law to enter a 287(g) agreement with ICE, Dillon’s 
Rule precludes him from having agency to do so.  Accordingly, 287(g) 
agreements entered unilaterally by sheriffs are likely not enforceable 
in most cases.  In this scenario, the formal, written MOA required by 
§ 287(g) for local law enforcement to carry out federal immigration 
policy cannot legally empower sheriffs to detain suspected 
undocumented immigrants absent some other legal authority.  Thus, 
the individuals detained under the seventy-one 287(g) agreements 
across the country signed solely by sheriffs may well deserve Fourth and 
Fifth Amendment protections, as well as other constitutional 
protections that are being withheld through their detention. 
Dillon’s Rule does not preclude all 287(g) agreements, especially 
those that exist in states where the doctrine does not apply.  
Furthermore, a Dillon analysis can differ significantly from state-to-
state, and there is always the unlikely possibility that Home Rule might 
serve to offset Dillon’s Rule.  But the local government oversight 
function that Dillon’s Rule protects must be respected in the 
jurisdictions that recognize the doctrine, and sheriffs should not be 
allowed to overstep the legal authority vested in them by the states they 
serve, especially when constitutional rights are on the line. 
                                               
 248. See ICE Section 287(g), supra note 19 (providing access to a copy of all 287(g) 
agreements in the United States). 
